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INTRODUCTION 
Why do we remember some events or experiences, yet forget others? 
Are we more likely to remember our positive experiences, or those that 
are negative? The question of how human memory works, and how it 
occasionally fails to work, has recently been of great interest to 
psychologists. This question is not something new, of course. In fact, it 
is a question that has intrigued scientists and philosophers since long 
before the field of modern cognitive psychology emerged--a field which 
some currently believe holds great promise for clarifying the nature of the 
functioning of the human mind. Science has advanced significantly 
since early researchers first explored this area. Yet, despite a vast 
repository of knowledge crystallized from the work of literally thousands 
of scientists--chemists, physicists, psychologists, biologists, etc.--the 
precise nature of the relationship between emotion/ mood and memory 
remains unclear. It is--to borrow the words of Winston Churchill {1959)-
-"a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Among the problems 
intricately woven into the question of how mood affects memory is the 
question of how memory itself "works." For example, just how do we 
remember? How, we might ask, is remembering "caused"? Further, what 
effects do such feeling states as depression, elation, and anxiety have on 
the ability to recollect experiences from the past? 
Recent examinations of the relationship of mood to memory have 
generally adopted formulations from within the domain of cognitive 
psychology, a field built around what is essentially a computer metaphor. 
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The theoretical bases of current descriptions of the cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral aspects of human behavior can, it is hoped, be tested 
through methods similar to those used to test the physical models found 
in the sciences mentioned above. In accord with this machine metaphor, 
recent attempts to explain the relationship between mood and memory 
typically employ a "bottom-up" (i.e., inductive) approach. This push for 
an inductive science has a history which dates back many centuries. The 
goal of such approaches is to gather up as much "basic" information as 
possible, and then to build upward toward an evolved understanding of 
mental functioning. Important in this respect are network theories of 
emotion and memory, which seek to delineate nodal connections after 
the presumed functioning of the neurons in the brain (or the bytes of 
memory found in a computer). Another feature common among current 
memory models is the belief that memory can be divided into more or less 
discrete stages corresponding to so-called "storage" and "retrieval" 
operations. In the former phase, information is encountered and 
assimilated into existing knowledge structures. In the latter phase, 
information in the ongoing cognitive, emotional, and physical 
environment is used in the acquisition of memory from the memory 
network. Such concepts make sense if we view the human being as 
essentially responding to input stimuli, stimuli which "activate" the 
individual in potentially predictable ways. 
Two primary areas of research into the nature of mood/emotion and 
memory have explored the phenomena known as mood-state-dependent 
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memory and mood-congruent memory. In the former case, any 
similarities in the context of "encoding" are expected to facilitate memory 
when present again at the time of retrieval. In the latter case, 
congruence between the learner's mood and the affective valence of the 
material is expected to facilitate memory. What emerges, however, is 
anything but a picture of clarity. Though there are patches of 
consistency in the empirical literature, particularly in the case of mood 
congruence, the mechanistic theories (and their attendant learning 
theories based on frequency and contiguity) that have been proffered to 
account for such findings have generally been unable to subsume and 
hence bring order to these diverse results. Why have such formulations 
failed? 
In what follows, we contrast mechanistic or non-teleological notions 
such as Bower's (1981) nodal network theory with Rychlak's (1981) 
Logical Learning Theory, the latter of which may be seen as a Kantian 
phenomenological perspective. Logical Learning Theory takes a more 
individualistic perspective by opposing predication to traditional 
cognitive mediational formulations. This is a broad-based theoretical 
conception, capable of subsuming (and lending order to) the domains of 
both affect and memory. In accord with this more Kantian alternative 
we offer the conception of affective assessment to more adequately 
account for methodological findings on the functioning of the human 
mind, and, in particular, those relating mood and emotion to memory. 
Of primary importance is the fact that rather than using nomothetic 
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averages in testing our hypotheses about mood and memory, Logical 
Learning Theory takes an idiographic (i.e., individually-oriented) 
approach. It is expected that by taking into consideration the manner in 
which a subject affectively frames a task (i.e., positively or negatively), 
and by having subjects individually rate learnable items along a bipolar 
dimension of like-dislike, greater order and understanding can be 
brought to the diverse methodological findings alluded to above. 
Suggestions of the utility of this construct in the extant literature will 
also be discussed. By employing this idiographic methodological 
approach in concert with a non-mechanistic theoretical understanding of 
the functioning of mind, we hope to render a more cogent account of the 
nature of mood and memory. 
CHAPTER 1 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to make clear the crucial differences in the accounts to be 
presented, time is here taken to delineate some of the fundamental 
distinctions in the terminology to be employed. 
The Grounds of Explanation in Psychological Science 
The notion of causation, particularly as it relates to human behavior, 
is extremely important to the present discussion. Theories of causation 
can form part of, or be derived from, broad metaphysical doctrines, and 
in this light it may be seen that such doctrines delineate for their 
authors what sorts of things may be taken to be causes. This is 
important, insofar as what one takes to be a cause has great significance 
for what kind of theory of causation one finds acceptable. As suggested 
above, scientists have all too often failed to conceptualize even the 
possibility of intentional human behavior. Royce ( 1988), commenting on 
this predicament, has stated: 
Psychologists can easily discover free choice. Their problem is to 
explain it, and the attempt is doomed to failure at the outset if 
you start with confused philosophical concepts of causality, 
chance, predictability, and the like. To understand choice requires 
a philosophical competence, including what Aristotle called 'first 
philosophy' or metaphysics, to which few psychologists ever 
aspired. The dilemma was this: the facts of free choice kept 
reappearing, but the psychologists were unable to handle them in 
terms of the only philosophy they knew. To deny fact is 
5 
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unscientific, yet philosophical ineptitude seemed to be forcing 
them to do just that. (p. 378) 
Much of early Greek philosophy was concerned with the categorization 
of knowledge into various classes. In fact, Greek philosophers sought to 
formulate a finite number of categories or predicates (another means of 
referring to such highly abstract, broadly conceived predicates is to speak 
of universals) which might then be brought to bear for the purpose of 
ordering the world in some logical fashion: "It was because they believed 
that some such abstract predicates lent meaning to all of experience that 
the Greek thinkers sought to devolve meanings 'from the universal to the 
particular"' (Rychlak, 1991, p. 16). In this regard the Greeks, and 
particularly Aristotle, were successful in delineating a causal framework 
capable of subsuming all things known or knowable. We turn now to a 
brief examination of this framework, put forth originally by Aristotle and 
employed with slight modification by Rychlak (1981). The utility of the 
four-causal framework to be discussed here is found in its ability to help 
clarify the grounds "for the sake of which" anything can be explained. 
The Four Causes 
The first of the causes employed by Aristotle is the material cause, or 
"the passive receptacle on which the remaining causes act" (Bunge, 1963, 
p. 32). The material cause is taken to be the literal substance which 
goes to comprise anything. Thus, for example, a chair might be said to 
be made of wood. It may be noted that in employing Aristotle's concept 
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in this way we are not following his strict usage of the term (see Rychlak, 
1988, p. 5). This is in line with the realization that we have not set out 
to adopt Aristotelian philosophy en toto. 
The second cause is the efficient cause, which reflects the impetus in 
events. Formulated in extraspective terms this suggests external 
compulsion, or an antecedent-to-consequent flow over time in which the 
former causes the latter. Thanks to the success of the natural sciences, 
it is this meaning of cause that is generally most readily brought to mind 
in discussions of causation (Rychlak, 1988, p. 5 ). The efficient cause-
effect sequence (antecedent-to-consequent) may be contrasted with 
accounts which forego this push across time. Important to 
considerations of meaning and meaning-extension, for example, is a 
precedent-sequacious flow of events (to be discussed below), which 
reflects a logical ordering of events sans time. 
The third cause of interest is the formal cause, a patterned meaning 
which may be seen as "the essence, idea, or quality of the thing 
concerned" (Bunge, 1963, p. 32). The objects and patterns of the world 
become "recognizable styles of this or that significance to the viewer, who 
comes to know them as much by these features as by their substantial 
nature (material cause) or the fact that they are assembled (efficient 
cause)" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 6). It is important to recognize that in our 
efforts to construct or abstract a theoretical system to account for the 
world around us, our reasoning inevitably culminates in a meaningful 
pattern of conceptions and designations. In fact, although no one cause 
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by itself can account for all things. it may be seen that. ultimately. the 
material cause mentioned above breaks down to become what we have 
here called formal causality. In this sense, the material cause cannot be 
taken as most "basic" to explanation (as some theorists, such as the 
materialists, have claimed). Alan Watts ( 1963) has summarized the 
situation as follows: 
... when the scientist investigates matter or stuff, he describes what 
he finds in terms of structured pattern. When one comes to think 
of it, what other terms could he use? The sensation of stuff arises 
only when we are confronted with patterns so confused or so 
closely knit that we cannot make them out. To the naked eye a 
distant galaxy looks like a solid star and a piece of steel like a 
continuous and impenetrable mass of matter. But when we 
change the level of magnification, the galaxy assumes the clear 
structure of a spiral nebula and the piece of steel turns out to be a 
system of electrical impulses whirling in relatively vast spaces. The 
idea of stuff expresses no more than the experience of coming to a 
limit at which our senses or our instruments are not fine enough 
to make out the pattern. (pp. 12-13, italics added) 
The fourth of the causes of interest here is the final cause, which 
Aristotle himself coined and made central to his physics (Rychlak, 1988, 
p. 6). It was Aristotle's belief that in order to render a full account of 
anything, we must state the reason or purpose "for the sake of which" 
something exists or is created: "Aristotle took organic development as his 
paradigm for explaining all material change, and he saw this in terms of 
development toward a mature form (e.g., the adult oak tree). He was 
prepared to apply this idea to the development of minerals in the ground 
and to the whole cosmos" (White, 1990, p. 4). It was this unwarranted 
assigning of final causes to nature, as when Aristotle proposed that 
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leaves existed for the sake of shading fruit on trees, that later theorists 
were to find distasteful. Rychlak (in press) has spoken of the "Baconian 
criticism" in this regard: 
It was Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who led the assault on such 
final-cause description in science. Pointing his guns at Aristotle, 
Bacon (1605/ 1952) said that it is bad scientific explanation to 
suggest that leaves on trees are "for the sake of " shading fruit, or 
that skeletal bones are "for the sake of' holding up the fleshy parts 
of the body (p. 45 ). Since we can fully explain trees, leaves, bones, 
and flesh using material and efficient causes, with the possible 
addition of occasional formal causes, any such final-cause 
phraseology is unnecessary. Thus, the Baconian Criticism holds 
that telic description in natural science adds nothing to the 
account! Bacon admitted final causation into the realm of 
metaphysics. But he definitely thought it was superfluous in 
physical description. (Rychlak, 1994) 
In the present account we will argue that while this is true enough when 
we are speaking about the inanimate objects of the world--and, perhaps, 
some lower organisms as well--the value of the final-cause in accounting 
for human behavior is readily demonstrated. 
The Nature of Theoretical Explanation 
In general, our theoretical conceptions come first, providing the 
grounds upon which we subsequently base our methodological attempts 
at validating our conceptions of reality. We must avoid the tendency, 
however, to assume that what has been observed and recorded in the 
experimental context necessarily provides a complete description 
(explanation) of the phenomenon under study. All too often the 
precedent meanings framed in an experimental context are assumed to 
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be the only ones capable of explaining the events observed. Unless we 
keep separate our methodological descriptions and our theoretical 
accounts, we are open to committing the "affirming the consequent" 
fallacy, or what has also been called the "empiricist's error" (Rychlak, 
1988, p. 274). Regardless of the outcome of our well-controlled 
experimental outcome, there are always, in principle, N possible 
explanations for any observation. It follows from this that none of the 
four causes can be effectively "ruled-out" of a theoretical account on an!! 
priori basis. 
As will become more apparent in the discussion to follow, there has 
been a general tendency to ground or reduce explanatory accounts to 
what we shall be calling mechanistic (material- and efficient-) causation. 
Yet, the material and efficient cause grounds are not the only ones which 
can be employed to explain the various aspects of the world. Indeed, 
from the perspective of a teleological theory of mankind, they are neither 
desirable nor complete. As we shall see, though such extraspective 
mechanistic accounts have proven quite helpful in the study of the 
inanimate world, such conceptions leave much to be desired in the study 
of the human being. Consistent with good science, much of evidence 
adduced by current mechanistic theories of the person is to be used here 
to provide support for a teleological conception of human behavior. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE FAILURE OF TELEOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
A primary concern of those studying the relationship between mood 
and memory during the first portion of the twentieth century involved 
explaining the methodological finding of a relatively greater ease of recall 
for positive as opposed to negative memories (Singer & Salovey, 1988). 
Freudian theory, with its accompanying concept of repression, seemed to 
some to provide a theoretical context within which such notions might 
be validated. Thus, a portion of the original work in the area of mood 
and memory, viewed broadly, found its impetus in Freud's psychoanalytic 
psychology. 
According to Freudian theory, some memories or experiences were 
intentionally, albeit unconsciously, repressed owing to the nature of 
their content. Using his or her knowledge of the workings of the mind, 
as well as any clues provided by the individual, the job of the 
psychoanalyst was then to subtly cue the client into remembering these 
repressed associations. That is, the psychoanalyst sought to look at the 
patient from an introspective or "first-person" perspective, and from the 
scattered fragments of the patient's recollections, cull an explanation of 
present functioning: in so doing he or she sought to recreate that long-
forgotten emotional context, the remembrance of which would lead to 
insight--and, perhaps, cure. 
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It would not be going too far to say that Freud conceptualized an 
intentional being. Oatley ( 1988) has eloquently described the manner by 
which Freud encompassed a teleological outlook: 
Memory does indeed have a central place in psychoanalysis, but 
the key to Freud's theorizing about it is his treatment of it as 
related to human goals, wishes as he called them: how we 
sometimes act as if we had an intention but deny it. Freud's 
methods were methods for investigating goals and plans, by 
listening to patients' stories. A story makes sense only when 
the goals and plans of the actors are understood. Yes, Freud 
was interested in restoring memories, but the interpretations 
that psychoanalysts offer to fill gaps in a story do not fill any 
old gaps. They fill specifically those gaps left by missing 
intentions. They suggest goals that might have been forgotten 
or denied, but which might make sense of otherwise 
incomprehensible sequences of action. (p. 11) 
Though he originally sought to align himself with the extraspective 
meanings devolving from the primary influences of the day, including the 
medical model, natural science, mathematics, and evolutionary theory 
(Rychlak, 1981), Freud found himself sorely pressed to do so. In fact, 
though he ultimately settled on an awkward mental energy conception 
called "libido," Freud had strayed far from the theoretical conceptions of 
men such as Brucke, Helmholtz, and other prominent figures of the day. 
Freudian conceptions of human mental processes, including memory, 
eventually fell from favor as individuals sought to examine reality in a 
presumably more objective and empirical--hence extraspective--fashion. 
Introspection, though considered by many of the time (e.g., Wundt, 
Brentano) to be a viable method of studying the human being, was faced 
with the increasing successes of the physical sciences in explaining the 
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world using extraspective and non-teleological scientific theory. 
According to Tageson (1982), perhaps the greatest factor in the demise of 
introspection and the study of consciousness was the discovery of the 
"conditioned reflex" by Ivan P. Pavlov in the early part of the twentieth 
century: "Objectively induced under rigid laboratory controls, 
quantifiable, publicly observable in terms of related stimuli and 
responses, the conditioned reflex was seized upon as the new building 
block for empirical psychology" (p. 4). The metaphysical framework of 
psychology was now cast in stone. 
The Lockean Paradigm 
In a very real sense, the momentum of the early physical sciences in 
making sense of the world was sufficient to carry its paradigmatic 
conceptions fully over and into the theoretical outlook of psychology. By 
affecting the foundational assumptions of this growing field, psychology's 
conception of the nature of the human being--and for our purposes, the 
relationship of mood I emotion and memory--was radically altered. The 
result was an attempt to firmly ground theoretical explanations in terms 
of material and efficient causation, then seen as most basic in nature. 
Sherif ( 1992) has commented on this occurrence as follows: 
Undeniably, the prestigious and successful sciences in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century were those securely focused 
on the physical world and the physical processes of the organic 
world. Psychologists, in their strivings to gain status with other 
scientists, did not pause long on issues raised by the differences 
between studying a rock, a chemical compound, or an animal, on 
the one hand, and a human individual, on the other. Instead, 
14 
methods that had been successful in the physical and biological 
sciences were embraced as models for psychology. Researchers 
were soon deep into analogy, comparing the human individual to 
the chemical compound or to the animal as the subject of 
research, with all of the power that such an analogy gives to the 
scientific investigator. at least if the animal is captive and small. 
Unlike the natural scientist, however, the psychologists had only 
social power over the research subject, not the greater power to 
explore, observe, and analyze that had unlocked so many of 
nature's secrets for the physical sciences. (p. 115) 
Though this exclusively extraspective stance is perhaps not surprising, 
given the historical antecedents, its legacy has been a progression of 
mechanical or machine accounts--to the exclusion of teleological 
accounts such as the one to be offered below. 
It was perhaps the British empiricist tradition which did the most to 
contribute to the formation of models of learning and development which 
presumed that the origin of knowledge could be traced back to the sense 
organs. There was much carryover from the British Empiricist position 
to the growing behavioral paradigm in the United States: 
[British Empiricism] has a certain aesthetic appeal and has been 
the typical choice of the tough-minded theorist. Most behavioral 
scientists have considered the British Empiricist position to be the 
more "scientific" position. Thus, when American psychology shifted 
to Behaviorism, there was a drastic shift in the subject matter of 
psychology (from phenomenal experience to behavior), but no 
change in each of the assumptions outlined above. On these 
fundamental issues stimulus-response psychology was in total 
agreement with British Empiricism. (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984: p. 
98) 
The position thus taken delineated a tabula rasa intellect, or what was 
defined by Popper (1972) as "the bucket theory of the mind." In other 
words, the mind is considered to be an empty or almost empty container 
into which "information" procured through the senses is accumulated 
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and later assimilated. 
Such a portrayal pointed back to the naive realism of John Locke 
(1632-1704), an important figure in our understanding of the historical 
antecedents of what we take to be the contemporruy opposing theories to 
be discussed in this paper. Such models shall henceforth be spoken of 
as Lockean conceptions. It was Locke who spoke of the mind as existing 
along the lines of an empty cabinet, into which experience deposits 
sensory datum in linear fashion. Locke, who aligned himself with the 
British Empiricists and thus against nativistic thinking, noted that "if 
truth is native to the human mind, it is useless to search for it outside 
of the mind by observation and experimentation" (Jacobson, 1982). He 
appealed for scientists and thinkers to examine the world external to 
themselves in order to discover the true source from which all ideas 
originated. 
Locke's philosophy held several basic tenets with regard to the human 
being. First of all, as is perhaps already clear, all knowledge was seen as 
being derived from the environment. Thus, it followed that the mind was 
composed of simple elements, elements which had been input, as into 
the cabinet mentioned above. And, according to the Lockean perspective, 
the fundamental mechanisms of learning are associationistic, relying 
therefore upon frequency and temporal contiguity. One consequence of 
these considerations was that the human being was seen as a mere 
bystander, the passive recipient of signals/elements arising from the 
environment. Indeed, what we have here is a precursor to the notion of 
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the "black box" which was to become prominent during the reign of 
behavioral psychology in the United States. Locke felt that all things, 
human beings included, could be best explained (that is, in accord with 
the Baconian criticism, with the least "theoretical baggage") in a 
demonstrative fashion: 
How comes [the mind] to be furnished? Whence comes it by 
that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has 
painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all 
the materials of reason and knowledge? [italics in original] To 
this I answer, in one word, from experience [italics added]. In 
that all our knowledge is founded: and from that it ultimately 
derives itself. (Jacobson, 1982, p. 10) 
Accordingly, meaning for Locke arises only as a sign, activated by the 
senses to represent the relations between successions of events. This is 
to say that we as human beings are born without "content" (without 
Platonic forms), and that as we grow older and receive more and more 
input from the environment, our behavior subsequently becomes more 
and more complex (in additive fashion). The Lockean conception of the 
human being was thus very much an extraspective account, as it viewed 
all meaning as arising outside of the individual. Rather than the outer 
world being meaningfully construed by the human being beginning at 
birth (a top-down process), all meaning arrives as input at whatever time 
the individual serendipitously comes into contact with various aspects of 
his or her world (a bottom-up process). Rather than viewing behavior 
from the perspective of a person who behaves "for the sake of' some goal, 
the account shifted explanation to those forces in the environment 
which pushed the hapless individual from state to state in an efficient 
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cause manner. 
An important consequence of the Lockean conception was the notion 
that all ideas were input from the environment over time. Thus, for the 
newborn to come to know any aspect of the world, he or she would have 
to exist in it for some indeterminate period, thereby inputting stores of 
information as he or she bumped and scraped along a narrow reality 
consisting mostly or entirely of the immediately sensible environment. 
Locke spoke of the newborn infant as follows: 
He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first 
coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored 
with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future 
knowledge. It is by degrees that he comes to be furnished with 
them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities 
imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of 
time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities 
come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the 
beginning of their acquaintance with them. [italics in original] 
(Taylor, 1961, p. 11) 
Thus, concepts like "mama" came to have meaning after being associated 
contiguously over repeated occurrences with positive and negative 
encounters. In this manner concepts like "good" and "bad" were also 
learned. Rather than being seen as two elements unified under one 
context in oppositional fashion (hence lending meaning one to the 
other), such evaluative notions were considered apposites--no more 
related to one another than concepts such as grass and concrete. Below 
we shall have more to say about the ideas of John Locke, ideas which 
were picked up by scientists eager to carry forward the empirical torch of 
knowledge. With alacrity and zeal, a great majority of thinkers since 
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Locke have adopted and then furthered the assumption that theo:iy poses 
more of a barrier to scientific knowledge than a means of attaining it. 
CHAPTER3 
A KANTIAN ALTERNATNE: LOGICAL LEARNING THEORY (LLT) 
The contemporary "problem" confronting the Logical Learning Theory 
advocate is this: spurred on by the successes of the natural sciences 
(e.g., physics, biology, etc.) in discovering relationships among the 
constituents of the outer world, contemporary psychology seems to have 
largely adopted a machine metaphor for explaining human behavior. As 
the so-called "natural" sciences relied upon extraspective observation of 
events, it seen;:ied plausible to look at the human being in this same 
extraspective and "empirical" fashion. Indeed, this appeared to many to 
be the most parsimonious means of explanation. However, significant 
portions of this thinking, which has provided the underpinnings for 
much of the theorizing in the field of psychology, are being rendered 
obsolete by contemporary understanding of the human being. Thus, 
much of what is to be presented here will serve to elucidate by way of 
contrast the position espoused by Logical Learning Theory, as against 
this machine metaphor. The goal is to render a cogent account of the 
need for a revision in contemporary thinking about the human being. It 
is hoped that from an explication of such problems as arise from what 
we have been calling the Lockean perspective, the tenets of LLT will 
follow smoothly, logically, and, perhaps, even necessarily. 
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The Nature of Co~nition 
In contrast to the mechanistic images of man examined above, 
Rychlak (1986) has proposed a teleological conception of the human 
being which he calls Logical Learning Theory (LLT). A teleological theory 
holds that the item under description, for our purposes the human 
being, intentionally chooses among alternatives before opting for any 
course of behavior. A framework of this sort entails the formulation of a 
more active and therefore introspective account of cognition, one in 
which "free-will" need not be reduced to or "explained away" as mere 
mechanism. Underwriting the LLT conceptualizations of the human 
being are formal- and final-cause constructs which, in contrast to the 
material- and efficient-cause constructs which underlie the great 
majority of contemporary cognitive theories, allow for a true freely-willing 
organism. Though not employing Kantian philosophy per se, LLT draws 
extensively from Kant's work in order to frame an intentional organism. 
It was Kant who argued that the mind imposes a "structure" on the 
world, in a priori fashion. Thus, any truths 
derive their necessary character from the inherent structure of our 
minds, from the natural and inevitable manner in which our 
minds must operate. For the mind of man (and here at last is the 
great thesis of Kant) is not passive wax upon which experience and 
sensation write their absolute and yet whimsical will; nor is it a 
mere abstract name for the series or group of mental states; it is 
an active organ which moulds and coordinates sensations into 
ideas, an organ which transforms the chaotic multiplicity of 
experience into the ordered unity of thought. (Durant, 1926, p. 
291) 
The perspective offered by Rychlak may be said to be a predicational, 
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rather than mediational, account. Predication is here to be understood 
as an act of affirming, denying, or qualifying precedently broader patterns 
of meaning in relation to narrower or targeted patterns of meaning 
(Rychlak, 1986). A key feature of LLT is a belief that some of the 
meanings confronted by the individual are dual, such that they present 
the person qua conceptualizer with two or more alternatives in any act of 
cognition. Such an account meets what is here taken to be the 
requirement of showing how it is possible for the human being to frame 
alternatives in an act of cognition, choose from among these, and then 
behave for the sake of such premises or affirmations. The presence of 
such alternatives, arising naturally via a dialectical (or oppositional) 
reasoning capacity, necessitates the rendering of a predication 
(affirmation, choice, etc.), and hence opens the way for a teleological 
account. 
Theory of Leamin" 
The key to a teleological theory is meaning, as understood 
introspectively by the individual under consideration. Meaning therefore 
arises not from pre-patterned wholes input from the environment as 
suggested by John Locke, but rather from the meaningful affirmations 
"for the sake of which" the individual comes to understand and act upon 
the world. Thus, stimulus inputs from the environment are not taken in 
and stored as such, but rather must be rendered significant by the 
person concerned. The ability to predicate is innate, so that we do not 
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learn to predicate, but rather predicate in order to learn. Further, the 
passage of time, so necessary to mechanistic accounts of learning, is 
superfluous to the account of LLT, relying as it does on a principle of 
meaning-extension. 
From the LLT perspective, cognition itself is an ordered sequence of 
patterned meaning, flowing from the broader to the narrower realms of 
understanding (Rychlak, 1986, p. 740). Such a process involves 
predication, and necessarily makes use of formal- and final-causation in 
accounting for the flow of human mentation (Rychlak, 1986). That is, in 
order to understand the behavior of another, we must see this individual 
as he or she introspectively frames (patterns, renders meaningful) some 
aspect of the world, and then acts "for the sake of' this affirmation 
(predication) in moving towards a desired end. 
In order to escape the problems posed by mechanistic explanations, 
LLT looks to the tautology as a fundamental aspect of the principle of 
meaning-extension. A tautology, from this perspective, is 
... a patterned relationship of identity between items (things, words, 
outlines, arguments, numerical values, shapes, etc.): this 
relationship is not created by antecedents thrusting consequents 
along, but obtains when the patterns related meaningfully fall into 
line as 'more or less' identical. (Rychlak, 1984, p. 400) 
Tautology is commonly understood from an extraspective perspective as 
mere repetition. However, when seen from an introspective perspective, 
tautology becomes a fundamental aspect of the predicational process, by 
which "known" or predicated meanings (contents) are sequaciously 
extended (via a telosponsive process: see below) to other so-called 
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"targets" of meaning. Partial tautology can be seen in both analogy and 
disanalogy, from which follow also such notions as metaphor, allusion, 
etc. By way of example, metaphor occurs when a figure of speech that 
ordinarily designates an item or idea is used to designate a dissimilar 
object or idea for the purpose of suggesting a comparison or analogy, as 
when one speaks of the "evening of life." Such extensions of meaning 
can be logical or illogical, of course, and LLT seeks to explain both 
rational and irrational thoughts and behaviors via this broad-ranging 
process. 
In light of the trap set by much of the common nomenclature of 
psychology, a term was needed to replace the traditional response 
conceptions mentioned above. To meet such a need, Rychlak (in press) 
has formulated the concept of telosponsivity, defined as follows: 
A telosponse is the affirmation or taking of a position regarding a 
meaningful content (image[s], word[s], judgmental comparison[s], 
etc.) relating to a referent acting as a purpose for the sake of which 
behavior is then intended. Affirmation encompasses predication. 
The predication, or predicate meaning, is the content of the predicational 
process, and is extended, either in whole or in part, via the person's 
ability to tautologize. Such conceptualizations are anchored at the 
protopoint, or the point of meaning-extension at which the affirmation 
is made. As suggested earlier, this is a necessary part of any cognitive 
act, because the dialectical (oppositional) reasoning capacity of the 
individual provides alternatives in each life event. Opportunities in life 
are not "out there" in the external world so much as they are "in here," 
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framed within the cognizance of the person in question. We shall see 
below that dialectical contrasts, consisting as they do of an intrinsic 
relational tie (rather than an extrinsic relational tie), are often of an 
evaluative nature. That is, in contrast to demonstrative (Lockean) 
formulations, which concentrate more or less upon quantitative 
relations, dialectical relations take as their primary (though not 
exclusive) focus the qualitative aspects of lived experience. Computers, 
which reason exclusively in demonstrative fashion, are not capable of 
consciousness. Human consciousness, on the other hand, which always 
presents the individual with contrasting implications in experience, 
arises precisely because of the need to "take a position." 
Protopoint Affirmation and Memory 
Above we noted that the affirmation in telosponsivity is made at a 
protopoint. at which time that meaning is framed which will be extended 
tautologically into ongoing cognition. The logical ordering here is from a 
precedent meaning to its sequacious (i.e., necessary) extension. A 
fundamental premise of LLT is that the meanings framed in the 
telosponsive process extend necessarily once they have been affirmed as 
relevant to the circumstances facing the individual. Prior to this 
affirmation the meaning or meanings may be countered by uncertainties, 
ambivalences, and the like. The research literature in the field of 
psychology has reflected precedent-sequacious meaning-extensions in 
such various notions as inference, attribution, implication, impression 
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formation, induction, and deduction (Rychlak, 1994). We now turn to 
some of the many examples of predication and telosponsivity to be found 
in psychology. 
Turning back to the short-lived Wurzburg School of Imageless 
Thought, established just after the turn of this century, we find 
precedent-sequacious meaning extension in such concepts as "aufgabe" 
and "einstellung." The aufgabe, or the experimenter's predication via 
task instruction, could be seen to establish a precedent einstellung 
(predicating bias) for the subject under study, a bias which was then 
extended sequaciously into the findings of the ongoing experiment. Asch 
(1946), in an early study examining impression-formation, found that if 
subjects were told that a person was "intelligent, industrious, impulsive, 
critical, stubborn, and envious" they were predisposed to evaluate this 
individual more positively than if the same characteristics were conveyed 
in the opposite order. The initial affirmation of the individual as 
intelligent appears to have framed a precedent set (einstellung) that 
extended sequaciously into the ongoing impression in the face of some 
contrasting evidence, which seems then to have been re-predicated in 
terms of this more positive protopoint affirmation (Asch, 1946, p. 69). 
The importance of the manner in which experience is predicated is 
also well demonstrated by the work of Sperling ( 1960), in his 
investigations of sensory memory. In his earlier research, Sperling had 
subjects view an array of letters which were presented for brief periods of 
time. They were then asked to recall as many of the letters they had seen 
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as possible. Sperling found that no matter how many letters were 
presented, subjects were limited in their recall to four or five letters using 
this whole report procedure. He then used a partial report procedure 
which asked subjects to recall only a portion of the array of letters (a 
single group of letters in either a row or column). Using a tone, subjects 
were cued regarding which row or column was to be recalled. 
Interestingly, Sperling found that subjects could recall any row or 
column virtually without error, even when the tone was presented up to 
300 milliseconds after the termination of the visual display. Clearly, the 
entire array was available for recall by the subjects. But what they 
would or could recall was not stimulus bound. While critics might argue 
that the subjects' retention was "determined" by the experimenter, upon 
reflection we might see that it is only because the subjects' themselves 
consented to the procedure that the results came out in the pattern of 
interest. Given an unwillingness to follow the procedures outlined by 
the experimenter (the "aufgabe"), subjects might easily have predicated 
the task differently ("einstellung"), leading to other than the anticipated 
results (See Page, 1972, who found examples of subjects who did not 
conform to a response-reinforcement contingency, despite clearly 
understanding the experimental expectations). 
Another example of the importance of the manner in which the task 
is predicated is provided by the work of Pichert and Anderson ( 1977). In 
a series of experiments, these researchers had subjects alter the 
perspective from which they read and then recalled a story. In one 
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instance, they had readers adopt the perspective of either a homebuyer or 
a burglar when attempting to recall information associated with a house. 
They found that subjects who, for example, had adopted the perspective 
of a burglar were more likely to recall having seen a color television, 
while subjects who had adopted the homebuyer stance were more likely 
to recall information about a leak in the roof. The point is that the 
recall of material was not caused in mechanical (material- and efficient-
cause) fashion, either by the sensory stimulus, or the instructions of the 
experimenter. The recall observed reflected the subjects' unique 
predication of the task ("aufgabe") at hand. Logical Learning Theory 
would argue that though such examples of precedent-sequacious 
meaning-extension are legion in the everyday activities of all individuals, 
the fact that they are often clothed in mechanistic garb renders them 
difficult (or impossible) to see. 
One area of particular difficulty for traditional mechanistic theories 
of learning occurs in cases similar to those just mentioned, but in which 
oppositionality is involved. We have thus far been mostly concerned 
with the "inside" of a Euler circle arrangement (circles within circles, we 
might say) as meaning is extended from the broader to the narrower 
realm of understanding. But as has been suggested above, we have also 
to consider the "outside" of this logical arrangement. According to LLT, 
the intrinsic relational tie of inside to outside should facilitate memory 
performance under some circumstances. Schema theory predicts that 
what is familiar (in the sense of having been encountered repeatedly) is 
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what will be ingrained in mind, hence remembered. The schema is the 
inside of our Euler circle arrangement, and its meaning is extended to 
some target. But the advantage to be gained in having familiarity {in LLT 
terms, a meaningful predicating framework) with some item or experience 
extends beyond this, to include the effects of contrast and/ or negation 
on memory. 
In an experiment by Hastie and Kumar ( 1979), for example, subjects 
were given trait descriptions establishing a target person as "honest." 
This was done in order to have subjects formulate a particular schema of 
this individual. Subjects were then given information which was either 
consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant to the question of the target 
individual's honesty. It was found that subjects recalled significantly 
more inconsistent information than consistent or irrelevant data. A 
similar finding occurred when Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, and 
Dougherty ( 1989) had subjects study the layout and contents of either an 
office or a preschool classroom and then recall what they had seen. 
Within each of these settings, some subjects saw items inconsistent with 
what their "schemas" would lead them to expect (for example, an ashtray 
in a preschool classroom). At recall, subjects were once again found to 
recall significantly more items inconsistent with the setting than items 
consistent with it. This occurs because contrast and negation are a part 
of every predication, so that even inconsistent or unexpected information 
contributes meaningfully to what is being framed. 
The notion that meaning is extended from a "broader" realm of 
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meaning to a "narrower" realm of meaning leads us to expect other 
specifiable patterns of results in the area of memory research; more 
specifically, in the area that we may call "predicate cueing" (Rychlak, 
1994). For example, if the sentence "A pan can be used as a drum" has 
been seen before but is presently "forgotten," cueing the subject with 
either the word "pan" or "drum" will be seen to improve memory over 
what it would otherwise be (Rychlak, 1994). However, from the LLT 
perspective a further distinction is possible, in that we would expect a 
greater facilitation to occur with the cue "drum" than with the cue "pan." 
This relates to our principle of meaning-extension, wherein a broader 
expanse of knowledge or meaning (here, the broader predicate meaning) 
is brought to bear conceptually "onto" a narrower or more focused target. 
In order to demonstrate such cueing effects, while showing that such 
effects are not simply the result of linguistic conventions, Stilson ( 1988) 
gave subjects word triplets, each consisting of three words. Within each 
triplet, one word was broader in meaning (relative to the other two 
words), and therefore capable of sequaciously extending meaning to the 
' remaining words. So, for example, if given the triplet "nose, face, smile," 
the word "face" would be most likely to be employed as the predicate 
meaning. Given that a subject has read this triplet, but now cannot 
bring it to mind, do we expect a greater facilitation from the use of "face" 
as a cue, one of the other two possible words, or should it not make any 
difference? According to traditional cognitive psychological theories, this 
should not make any difference, since ease of recall is presumed to be 
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based on frequency and contiguity measures. However, according to LLT, 
since "face" is capable of subsuming and hence lending meaning to both 
"smile" and "nose," we would expect a greater facilitation from the cueing 
of this term. This is what was found. Although cueing subjects with any 
of the three relevant words aided memory, the greatest facilitation was 
shown with words judged to be broader in context meaning. 
In the ways mentioned above, we see the importance of what the 
subject "brings to bear" both inside and outside of the experimental 
context. We next turn to a consideration of "affection," which LLT takes 
to be the most "basic" precedent dimension utilized to frame experience. 
A Basic Dimension on which to Build 
As stated above, LLT is based on conceptions which allow for a freely-
willing organism. As a first step toward the formulation of such a 
teleological conception of the human being, there began a search for a 
cognitive process which could not itself be reduced to traditional 
mechanistic explanations of learning (Rychlak, 1988). Such a 
conception would need to be capable of demonstrating a unique and 
unlearned contribution of the individual to the process of knowledge 
acquisition. We said above that an individual must essentially "know" 
in order to "know." But we have already rejected the idea of inherited 
mental ideas or "contents." If the individual is not born with innate 
contents, then how is it possible for the individual to extend a first 
predicating meaning? The realm of affection offered some hope of 
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formulating such a construct. 
Based upon our dialectical account of human reason, the term 
affective assessment was chosen to denote the unique contribution of 
the individual to his or her thought processes. A purely cognitive act, 
affective assessment referred to the ability of the individual to sort 
(organize) the varying contents of the world (including literally anything 
known or knowable) along a bipolar dimension of like-dislike. Affection 
is involves, not activation, but predication. Such a capacity is made 
possible by transcending telosponsivity, or the innate capacity of the 
individual to "step back" and reflexively construe (i.e., evaluate) the 
meanings of his or her predications (cognitions). In so doing, the person 
characterizes all such meaningful contents as either liked (positive 
evaluation) or disliked (negative evaluation) in quality. 
This affective conception is taken to be the broadest possible frame of 
reference by which an individual may sort the varying aspects of his or 
her world. One benefit of an idiographic conception such as affective 
assessment is that it allows for an examination and explanation of 
behaviors dating back to the very earliest days of life, as the newborn 
infant begins ordering and rendering cogent various aspects of the reality 
with which he or she is faced. 
The assumption made by LLT advocates in this research is that so-
called stimulus inputs or encodings of experience are not simply 
'recorded' conceptually as given, but that they must be predicated 
in the process of telosponsivity. In having to frame precedents of 
experience--and especially of highly unique experience, as in the 
task faced by infants--the dialectically reasoning human being falls 
back on the broadest possible meaningfulness to accomplish the 
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conceptual task. There is no broader range of meaning than a 
person's unique preferences, his or her 'likes' and 'dislikes' which 
can frame all possible experience as a kind of preferential 
predicate." (Rychlak, 1986, p. 746) 
For our purposes, the importance of this conception lies in its essential 
tie to LLT assertions regarding both mood and memory, to which we now 
turn. 
Research on Affective Assessment 
The concept of affective assessment is underwritten by the construct 
of telosponsivity, and is operationalized by asking subjects to render a 
judgment of "like versus dislike" in regard to some item in experience. In 
having the subject render such a judgment, we assume that the 
individual can meaningfully frame items such as pictures, faces, words, 
etc., along this bipolar dimension of "likability." An item thus 
considered becomes a "that for the sake of which" an evaluation 
(affective assessment) is rendered. Once such an evaluation has been 
made, the individual is likely to carry out the steps necessary to further 
his or her purposes, for as Rychlak (in press) states: "Affection orients 
the person to the future through choice." 
In the methodological context, subjects' telosponses are recorded on a 
four-point bipolar scale which ranges from "like much" and "like 
slightly," to "dislike slightly" and "dislike much." This provides a 
dialectical context within which is situated the individual's judgment. A 
variant, albeit congruent, way of thinking about the dimension of 
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affective assessment is to bring to mind the differences between the 
denotative and connotative meanings of any word. The denotative 
meaning of a word is that which can be sought in any dictionary. The 
connotative meaning, on the other hand, reflects a more individual 
assessment of the value of a word or concept for conveying an intended 
meaning. 
Findin~s on positive affection. Though originally understood in 
biological and mechanical (material- and efficient-cause) terms, there 
were suggestions in the extant literature that something like affective 
assessment was to be seen in human learning (Rychlak, 1981). Tait 
(1913), for example, had subjects rate a series of colors for pleasantness 
and unpleasantness and then measured their reaction time using a color 
recognition test. The findings indicated that subjects performed better 
on those items which they had rated as pleasant. Fluegel ( 191 7, 1925) 
had subjects keep a diary for a period of one month, during which time 
they recorded the duration, intensity, and quality of their experiences. 
Once again, the findings showed subjects listing more pleasant than 
unpleasant experiences. Though much of this early research was 
criticized on methodological and interpretational grounds (Singer & 
Salovey, 1988), the general finding of a learning superiority of pleasant 
over unpleasant and indifferent words continued to show through in 
most such studies (Rychlak, 1981 ). 
From the very beginnings of his work in this area, Rychlak ( 1966) 
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found that college students learned their liked eve trigrams more readily 
than their disliked trigrams. Matlin and Stang ( 1978) were subsequently 
to call this effect the "Pollyanna principle." Unfortunately, their 
explanation of this phenomenon fell back upon a positive reinforcement 
notion, in which the individual would form stronger associative bonds 
between the liked items to be learned and other liked information in 
memory based on mere exposure to the material. Similarly, it might be 
suggested that the learner expended more energy memorizing a positive 
item than a negative item, with a consequent stronger associative 
bonding hence better memory for the former than the latter. Thus, the 
meaningfulness of the material was determined externally "for" the 
person, who passively mediated such input and output relationships. 
This thinking is, of course, not consistent with LLT premises of how 
human mentation "works." 
In order to expand upon the premises ofLLT, a great deal of work was 
carried out in this area. The pattern results showing a facilitation for 
positive affection was extended to work involving colors and personal 
experiences, and in the learning of words (Andrews, 1972), abstract 
designs (McFarland, 1969), and names-to-faces (Galster, 1972). As the 
earlier research on pleasantness had suggested, subjects learned their 
liked trigrams more readily than their disliked trigrams. This robust 
finding obtained whether the experiments employed mixed lists (i.e., both 
liked and disliked trigrams included) or unmixed lists (i.e., either all 
liked or all disliked trigrams included) in paired-associates and serial 
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learning formats, and whether the rate of learning was tested using 
trials-to-criterion, recognition, or free recall (Abramson, 1967; 
Laberteaux, 1968; Rychlak, 1966). 
After having subjects prerate their study topics in an introductory 
psychology course, Slife and Rychlak ( 1981) found that students did 
better on those subjects they rated positively (liked) than those they did 
not (disliked). Similarly, underachievers typically learn what they like 
dramatically better than what they dislike, while those individuals who 
might be characterized as overachievers seem not to have great difficulty 
with this factor; that is, they perform well with both sorts of materials 
(Rychlak & Tobin, 1971). Subjects have been found to correctly identify 
"good" (liked) words at a shorter tachistoscopic exposure rate than "bad" 
(disliked) words (Johnson, Thomson, & Frtncke, 1960). 
Researchers have also found the effects of positive affection extending 
beyond the context of learning (i.e., memorizing, recalling). Adults who 
predicate themselves and the world around them positively tend to see 
themselves as causes of positive outcomes to a greater extent than they 
perceive themselves as causes of negative outcomes (Mirels, 1980; 
Sherman, 1980). Lott and Lott (1970) found that children who drew a 
picture of a liked peer gave it more detail than a drawing of a peer whom 
they disliked. Children with a favorable affective (positive or "happy") 
outlook may be seen to extend help to others to a greater extent than 
children with an unfavorable affective (negative or "unhappy") outlook 
(Strayer, 1980). 
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Another area of interest and relevance for the present study concerns 
what are known as "transfer" effects in learning. In the area of affective 
assessment, it has been found that there is a dramatic order-effect when 
subjects are given successive unmixed lists of either positive or negative 
materials (e.g., trigrams, words) to be learned. For example, in one study 
all 32 subjects moving from a disliked to a liked list manifest 
improvement in performance on the second list, while only 13 of the 32 
subjects reflected such improvement when moving from liked to disliked 
lists (Rychlak & Tobin, 1971). This is known as positive nonspecific 
transfer. It is "nonspecific" because the two lists of materials to be 
learned did not share any features in common. In order to extend these 
findings by showing that such results are not a consequence of linguistic 
considerations, Rychlak, Tuan, and Schneider (1974) contrasted 
association value (AV) with affection across lists of learnable items. 
They found that moving from lists high in meaningfulness to lists low in 
meaningfulness (and vice versa) did not effect transfer, whereas in 
moving from a disliked to a liked list subjects once again showed 
significantly greater improvement. Rychlak (in press) has pointed to the 
work of Premack (1965, 1971) as having relevance here also. Premack 
found that individuals will perform a disliked activity in order to then be 
able to engage in a liked activity. Similarly, Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, 
and Schilling (1989) report that the termination of a stressful event (by 
definition an affectively negative occurrence) tends to leave people in 
better moods than if these events had not occurred. Such studies, which 
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essentially reproduce the disliked-to-liked ordering of the first study 
mentioned above, add support to the notion of a general positive 
nonspecific transfer. In LLT terms, the move facilitates the learning of 
"normal" individuals, who employ their personal evaluative preferences to 
frame a context of meaning in which positive or "liked" meanings are 
more readily extended to the task at hand than negative or "disliked" 
meanings. In the process of telosponding the individual tautologtzes 
from his or her ongoing understanding (evaluative preference) "to" the 
situation at hand. 
Findings on negative affection. The LLT concept of affective 
assessment posited more than just a facilitation in the learning of liked 
items. If affection provides a broader context within which the 
individual situates his or her life experiences, it should also follow that 
individuals who predicate themselves, the task at hand, or materials 
involved in the task at hand negatively, might learn their disliked 
materials more readily than their liked materials. This follows from the 
nature of sequacious meaning-extension: negativity creates and/ or 
facilitates the extension of negative meanings, just as we saw above that 
positivity creates and/or facilitates the extension of positive meanings. 
Affection serves as a potent conceptual organizer of this nature. 
The relationship between affective learning style and ease of learning 
is dependent upon a combination of factors which, together, determine 
the facilitation or seeming inhibition of learning. Rychlak has carried 
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out numerous studies designed to demonstrate the effects of precisely 
these factors. This work sought to examine not only "normal" subjects, 
who might be expected to predicate the world in a more or less positive 
fashion, but also individuals who might be expected to predicate in a 
negative fashion. Among other things, Rychlak and others showed that 
adult patients given diagnoses such as schizophrenia, depression, and 
alcoholism, collapsed or even reversed the learning superiority for 
positively assessed items in the direction of favoring negative items 
(Mosbacher, 1984; Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971; Slife, 
Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984). These findings were extended also 
to elementary, high school, and college students with negative self-
images (August & Rychlak, 1978; August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975; 
Rychlak, Carlsen, & Dunning, 1974), and high school students who were 
forced to perform a learning task that they disliked (Rychlak & Marcell, 
1986, 1992). 
Again, not all subjects display significantly better performance for 
disliked than liked materials. In some cases the difference between the 
liked and disliked items is attenuated, with the result that there is no 
longer a significant advantage for the former items. This came to be 
known as a diminution of the ordinary "positive" effect. Others do, 
however, achieve a reversal, meaning that they learn significantly more 
disliked than liked items (August & Rychlak, 1978). In some cases, one 
gender subgroup in a sample might achieve a reversal, whereas the other 
would simply reflect a diminution (August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975; 
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Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & Abramson, 1971). In a study on high 
school students which crossed the factors of high or low self-image with 
ratings of "liking" or "disliking," an enforced paired-associates learning 
task was performed. The results indicated that although neither of these 
factors was by itself sufficient to achieve a reversal, when subjects were 
negative in self-image and forced to perform a disliked learning task, they 
did indeed learn significantly more disliked than liked eve (consonant-
vowel-consonant} trigrams (Rychlak & Marcell, 1992). 
It is important to emphasize that we are not dealing with some form 
of generalized "activation" here, so that even persons with primarily 
positive self-images will, in some cases, learn along the negative more 
readily than the positive. We must consider an individual's affirmed 
premises regarding his or her own areas of strength and weakness; that 
is, take into account the broader affective predication (positive or 
negative} which is brought to bear in understanding liked or disliked 
items of experience. To examine this issue, Rychlak, Carlsen, and 
Dunning (1974) had college subjects specify a positive and a negative 
realm of life activity. For example, some subjects rated "aggressively 
competing with others" as a liked activity, whereas "becoming passively 
intimate with others" represented a more stressful (disliked} activity. 
Other subjects were found who displayed an opposite preference: these 
subjects rated "aggressively competing with others" as a disliked activity, 
and "becoming passively intimate with others" a liked activity. Words 
were then found to represent each of these domains. In the area of 
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competitiveness, such words as "incentive," "decisive," "demanding," and 
"excelling" were employed, while words such as "sympathy," "pamper," 
"reverence," and "accepting" were utilized to denote passive-intimacy. 
Subjects rated these words along the dimension of affective assessment. 
As predicted, subjects learned according to the positive affective 
assessment effect within their liked realm, but showed a reverse tendency 
within their disliked realm. 
Finally, we find that this affective dimension is ubiquitous. For even 
the manner in which a therapist predicates (positively or negatively) the 
therapeutic situation is also quite important. This was demonstrated in 
a study of countertransference (Heiskell & Rychlak, 1986). Male medical 
students were used as subjects, playing the role of "psychotherapists." 
Male VA patients were used in the role of "therapy client." First, the 
veterans were videotaped while giving general information about 
themselves (such things as background, schooling, work history, etc.). 
Next, the veterans were asked to discuss two specific life concerns, one of 
a very positive nature and one of a very negative nature (e.g., job success 
versus sexual inadequacies). Then, in a pretest, and based on their more 
general comments, the medical students made RV (like-dislike) ratings of 
the patients. Each medical student was next asked to react verbally to a 
positive and negative videotaped statement made by a liked and a 
disliked patient, while acting as if he were in a therapeutic interview with 
each patient. These verbal statements were electronically recorded and 
later scored for empathy by judges who were unfamiliar with the medical 
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student's RV preferences. It was found that the medical students 
reflected the greatest empathy in their statements when they were 
responding to the positive life concerns of their liked veterans--but also 
to the negative statements of their disliked veterans. Thus, we see the 
rendering of affective judgments to be important on both sides of the 
therapeutic equation. 
According to Logical Learning Theory (LLT), learning occurs not 
through the frequency of repetitions of an item over time or when two 
items occur in close proximity to one another, but rather when a 
person's precedent premises sequaciously order, and hence meaningfully 
conceptualize whatever task or material is at hand. If the individual's 
frame of reference is unable to make sense of experience, no learning will 
take place. Frequency and contiguity measures such as time on task, 
practice, and rehearsal are all viewed as being of secondary importance, 
useful more to referentially track the items of experience than as 
principles of explanation (Rychlak, 1986). 
The Relationship of Mood and Memory in LLT 
According to Logical Learning Theory, affective assessment is a 
"cognitive" (predicational) process, and as such is not to be confused 
with emotion. The latter entity is conceptualized as a physical 
occurrence, more as something which happens "to" one in life's varying 
circumstances. Logical Learning Theory (LLT) defines emotion as follows: 
Emotion refers to the pattern of physiological feelings in a certain 
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life situation, the sum total of which is targeted and thereby 
organized into meaning by the predications of the person 
experiencing these feelings and living through the circumstances of 
the situation involved. Emotions are not telosponses. They are 
not arbitrarily generated by oppositionality, but occur in 
unidirectional fashion as do all biological and physical 
circumstances in experience. Emotional feelings can be stimulated 
by certain drugs, or by having the person recall an emotionally 
upsetting life circumstance. (Rychlak, 1994) 
That the two are distinct is suggested by the fact that the same emotion 
can be judged both liked and disliked, depending upon the context in 
which this judgment is made. Perhaps the best example of this involves 
anger. While this emotion can be a hindrance in one context, as for 
example when tiying to deal fairly with a disliked other, it can also be 
utilized to bring about positive ends, as when an individual with a 
traditional lack of will musters the courage to confront another by whom 
he or she feels slighted. 
The definition of emotion given above is designed to apply across the 
varying ways in which emotions might be said to function. In other 
words, whether emotions are the result of precedent cognitive appraisals, 
or are seen as conscious efforts to render meaningful some pattern of 
already occurring bodily reactions, the individual must make a unique 
contribution to the ongoing experience. Because of this requirement for 
active "participation" (predication) on the part of the person involved, 
one cannot "pretend" that something is liked when it is not, and thereby 
hope to sequaciously extend congruent meaning. Similarly, the 
intention to manufacture a genuine emotion cannot be fulfilled simply 
through an intention to "have it." As Rychlak (in press) has noted, in 
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order to capture an emotional mood we must place ourselves back into a 
situation that we have already experienced, during which time the 
emotion "came upon us:" "Just as inanimate physical events intrude on 
our behavior--as when we are suddenly caught in a cold downpour of 
rain--so too do biological intrusions occur as the person is swamped by a 
strange sensation during a life circumstance" (Rychlak, 1994, p. 135). 
Another characteristic of the distinction between affection (affective 
assessment) and emotion is that although these processes (Logos-Bios) 
can be congruent, they can at times also bear an oppositional 
relationship to one another. As William James (1948) noted long ago: 
The associationists may prate of an idea of pleasure being a 
pleasant idea, of an idea of pain being a painful one, but the 
unsophisticated sense of mankind is against them, agreeing with 
Homer that the memory of griefs when past may be a joy, and with 
Dante that there is no greater sorrow than, in misery, to recollect 
one's happier time. (p. 248) 
This does not mean, however, that once we are "down" we are 
constrained to experience this mood indefinitely, or until such time as 
our "state" of "activation" subsides. As Rychlak (in press) has suggested: 
"An unpleasant circumstance, once meaningfully framed, often teaches 
us to do what is necessary to make it pleasant. The concept of emotion 
does not include such directional suggestions .... Based on the intrinsic 
oppositionality of affection such a strategy is readily suggested" (p. 55). 
Thus, for example, the individual who is feeling unhappy or depressed 
can reason to the opposite of what is presently the case and conclude 
that by visiting a liked friend or reading a liked book, an "elevation" of 
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mood may be brought about. 
Much as the evaluation of an emotion or emotional experience is 
dependent upon the evaluation rendered by the individual, the same is 
true of "moods." Moods, which Morris (1989} describes as being both 
"pervasive" and "global," extend their meanings similarly, in precedent-
sequacious fashion. As we shall see, research on mood has shown that 
how people predicate a circumstance influences what they will recall, 
learn, or produce as an evaluation in subsequent events. If this is indeed 
the case, we might then expect that pleasant moods would facilitate the 
recall of such things as pleasant life situations or previously learned 
positive word meanings, while the reverse might hold true for those 
aspects of the world which are predicated negatively. Findings of this 
sort would be consistent with the precedent-sequacious style of 
explanation which is essential to LLT (indeed, such findings are taken up 
in later sections}. A "mood" is clearly a context meaning which must be 
predicated by the person involved: and once affirmed, its meaning 
extends to what is then under continuing cognitive formulation 
("processing"} (Rychlak, 1994}. Moods, which LLT takes to represent 
affective assessments, may subtly insinuate themselves into our ongoing 
awareness, thereby playing a role in determining what we remember 
(reconceptualize} from the past, as well as perceive in the present. If this 
is the case, then we would expect to see research findings in the mood 
and memory literature which are similar to the findings mentioned above 
(e.g., persons who predicate themselves positively might be expected to 
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learn liked materials more readily than those who dislike themselves, 
etc.). 
As we have said, affection acts as a significant conceptual heuristic 
to facilitate the learning of the individual. That is, affection may serve 
as a wider "context" or predicate meaning which can be extended into 
what will be known in cognition. This occurs according to the same 
sequence of meaning-extension discussed above. Such facilitation can 
occur both at what is called the point of "encoding" and at the point of 
"retrieval." In LLT terms, the former is equivalent to "affirmation at the 
protopoint" (Rychlak, 1994), wherein the material to be cognized is 
actively organized along one or more meaningful dimensions, including 
the dimension of affective assessment. 
If affective assessment is truly a very basic dimension which can be 
brought to bear at what we have referred to as the point of "encoding," 
then it should be possible to demonstrate these heuristic properties. 
Ulasevich (1993) carried out a "Judging John" experiment, in which he 
showed that subjects in a learning task will likely grasp the affective 
quality of a word that they do not yet "know" before they can give a word 
with a similar meaning to it. He did this by having subjects look at a 
computer screen and attempt to memorize a list of statements 
concerning "John." Subjects first read through the list on a practice 
trial, and then were immediately given a recall trial in which sentence 
stems were presented. If, after a predetermined period of time, the 
subjects had not been able to give an answer, one of two sets of 
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instructions appeared on the screen asking subjects either to type a word 
similar to the one they could not think of, or to type P or N for whether 
the affective quality of the word was positive or negative. Again, subjects 
were better able to provide the correct affective quality than a word with 
similar meaning. In fact, even in the latter case, the incorrect words 
presented tended to themselves have the correct affective quality. 
In order to examine the heuristic value of affective assessment at the 
point of "retrieval," Hughes (1993) had subjects think of appropriate 
examples of persons whom they considered to be either "positive" or 
"negative" in appeal. After bringing to mind such an individual, subjects 
were asked to read through a list of personality adjectives and mark 
those that most aptly described the individual in question. Following 
two recall opportunities, during which subjects were first asked to record 
in writing all of the adjectives which served as secondacy predications to 
the affirmed (primacy) target, followed by any other adjectives that could 
be recalled, she asked subjects to "reverse" the target of their primacy 
predications. At this point, subjects had presumably exhausted their 
memory from within the broader context provided by the primacy affirmed 
predication. The new task involved having subjects think of 
(conceptualize) an individual about whom they felt the opposite of the 
previous individual (for example, moving from a "liked" to a "disliked" 
individual, or vice versa). Once this "re-predication" had taken place, 
subjects were asked to once again think of the initial list of adjectives, 
and to try to recall any additional words which came to mind. 
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Specifically, subjects were asked to try to recall any of the previous 
adjectives which might suitably apply to the new target. It was indeed 
found that subjects recalled a significant number of additional words, 
but these words were consistent with the new primary affective 
predication. This is similar to the experiment reported earlier, in which 
it was found that cueing subjects with a broader predicate meaning in 
the case of word triplets showed a greater facilitation effect on memory 
than cues whose range of meaning was not capable of subsuming the 
other members of the word triplet. Such a finding is also reminiscent of 
the work of Sperling ( 1960} cited above, which demonstrated the 
importance of the protopoint affirmation made by the individual, above 
and beyond purely sensory factors. Subjects had clearly "seen" all the 
words presented in the present experiment, yet what they recalled was 
sequaciously determined (at least in part} by the precedent framework 
they brought to bear in the task. 
CHAPTER 4 
LOCKEAN THEORETICAL PERSPECTNES ON 
MOOD AND MEMORY 
Semantic Network and Schema Theories 
Bower ( 1981) has worked extensively with this area, and he interprets 
the findings of this vast literature in terms of an associative network 
theory of memory. Within this framework, information is represented in 
mind in the form of interrelated networks of nodes, these being 
connected by associative linkages of varying strength. He states: 
Human memory can be modeled in terms of an associative network 
of semantic concepts and schemata that are used to describe 
events. An event is represented in memory by a cluster of 
descriptive propositions. These are recorded in memory by 
establishing new associative connections among instances of the 
concepts used in describing the event. The basic unit of thought is 
the proposition: the basic process of thought is activation of a 
proposition and its concepts. (Bower, 1981, p. 134) 
These nodes themselves represent a vast array of concepts, and also 
include--in addition to memories--such things as emotions and the 
contexts of various experiences. When a particular node is activated, 
either by internal or external stimulation, associated nodes are also 
activated. If the activation of some particular node or network of nodes 
reaches a critical threshold, then a memory or feeling may enter 
conscious awareness. According to Bower, subthreshold excitations can 
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also add together, so that a number of weak stimuli or cues may also 
cross the threshold to consciousness. Bower here draws upon a concrete 
physical analogy to elaborate his point: 
A relevant analogy is an electrical network in which terminals 
correspond to concepts or event nodes (units), connecting wires 
correspond to associative relations with more or less resistance, 
and electrical energy corresponds to activation that is injected into 
one or more nodes (units) in the network. Activation of a node can 
be accomplished either by presentation of the corresponding 
stimulus pattern or by prior activation of an associated thought. 
(Bower, 1981, p. 134) 
This model can account for the finding that mood state-dependent 
retrieval is most efficient when the individual is undergoing a recall 
rather than a recognition task. In the former case, multiple-cues are 
needed to raise activation above the critical threshold, whereas in the 
latter case, presentation of the stimuli directly may retrieve the stored 
information without need of additional cueing. 
The primary predictions made by the Bower (1981) theory include (1) a 
mood-dependent retrieval effect, and (2) a mood congruity effect. The 
former is accounted for by the supposition that mood at encoding 
becomes associated with the material to be learned, such that 
reinstatement of that mood acts as an automatic retrieval cue to 
facilitate recall. That is, activation of the mood node associated with the 
memory of interest increases likelihood that the relevant memory will 
also be activated through its close association. The latter effect is 
presumed to occur when the valence of the affectively-toned material in 
the environment is congruent with the learner's state. In a situation 
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such as this, the learner is thought to selectively enhance positive 
material when in a positive mood, and negative material when in a 
negative mood. That is, the active emotion node sends activation to 
those perceptual categories which are associatively linked to it, thus 
rendering these categories ready for use. In addition, events that lead to 
pleasant evaluations will enhance a positive mood, while events which 
elicit a negative evaluation will tend to enhance a negative mood. In 
both cases, this congruity is hypothesized to lead to greater processing 
and hence better memory. 
The schema theories of mood and memory, which were said to be 
similar to associative network theories of the sort proposed by Bower 
( 1981 ), generally adopt the position that people have cognitive schemas 
which are consistent with their ongoing mood state. Schema theories 
which examine depression sometimes employ the notion of a negative 
schema (e.g., Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) through 
which the individual frames the world and the people in it. Once 
activated, this negative schema focuses the individual's attention of 
negative aspects of the environment, which in turn supports and hence 
perpetuates the generally negative outlook. A schema can be seen as an 
outline of a commonly occurring event or a prototypical exemplar of a 
concept. But schemas are not only employed by depressed persons, and 
another example might be a "restaurant script," consisting of the 
knowledge of the events that occur when eating at a fancy restaurant 
(Minsky, 1975). When such a schema is activated during the course of 
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information processing, attention is automatically directed towards 
information relevant to the schema. According to schema theory, 
ambiguous aspects of the environment will be interpreted according to 
any biases induced by the schema, and information consistent with the 
schema will be more readily elaborated upon and so better connected to 
other facts in memocy (for a contradictocy set of findings, see Pezdek, 
Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989). Differences between 
network theories such as Bower's and schema theories are perhaps not 
great, and, indeed, Bower himself frequently speaks of the activation of 
cognitive schemas within the framework of his own theory. However, 
schema theories do not employ the notion of spreading activation 
(Ingram, 1984) and are somewhat more compatible with Logical Learning 
Theocy than Bower's ( 1981) explication of network theory. Though this 
is probably not the intent of the majority of authors subscribing to 
schema theories, a schema may be regarded as similar to a pair of 
precedent conceptual spectacles which sequaciously "color" what is to 
follow in experience. So, for example, the depressed individual will tend 
to (sequaciously) extend negative meanings in experience more readily 
than positive meanings. 
Isen's Co2nitive Psych0Io2ical Perspective 
Another of the more prolific contributors to the area of mood and 
memory research has been Alice Isen. Seeking to take into consideration 
the difficulties associated with expectancy and demand when doing 
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research of this sort, Isen has produced a large number of studies outside 
the laboratory (though by no means exclusively in this realm) in an 
attempt to obtain greater ecological validity. Typically, this has been 
done using subtle mood manipulations and indirect measures of mood. 
It is worth noting, however, that Isen has failed to utilize idiographically 
evaluated materials, relying instead upon nomothetic evaluations where 
applicable. For this reason her research suffers from some of the same 
ambiguities as the more "conventional" research she has sought to 
improve upon. 
Isen's theoretical outlook is firmly grounded in a cognitive 
psychological framework. It is her belief that mood-related phenomena 
result from the activation of mood-induced cognitive processes, with 
important differential effects to be obtained depending upon how aware 
an individual is of their existence and/ or "activation." In line with 
Posner and Snyder (1975), who introduced the distinction, Clark and 
Isen ( 1982) have suggested that the cognitive processes that occur during 
moods are either "automatic" or "controlled." Automatic cognitive 
processes are thought to occur without intention or awareness, so that 
they do not "interfere" with other ongoing cognitive processes. 
Controlled processes, on the other hand, being both effortful and 
conscious, occupy our limited capacity information processing system 
and therefore can disrupt other cognitive activities. Clark and Isen 
(1982) attribute the majority of mood effects to automatic processes, 
which are the subject of the preponderance of her work. In this view, the 
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hedonic tone associated with the mood-inducing event insidiously causes 
us to retrieve similarly toned thoughts, thoughts which then influence 
our judgments, decisions, and behaviors. Note that rather than a 
precedent-sequacious meaning-extension taking place here, we see the 
material/efficient cause activation analogy being drawn upon. Another 
difficulty is that Clark and Isen do not specify the mechanism whereby 
the cognitive processes associated with a mood switch from the 
automatic to the controlled variety. Further, this latter notion of an 
independent ("controlled") contribution of the subject to the task at 
hand seems a bit out of place in the sort of theoretical framework 
adopted by Isen, though she apparently does not see any discrepancy 
here. 
How does mood influence the individual in automatic fashion? From 
a nodal network theory's perspective, the most likely factor would seem 
to be the absence or lack of a label or appraisal of an affective state. In 
the case of Isen's account, the typical cause of mood is an event of 
modest hedonic relevance, sufficient to prime thoughts sharing the same 
hedonic tone but insufficient to interrupt ongoing behavior and attract 
focal attention, occurrences Isen associates with emotion. Labeling does 
not occur because the event initially engages only automatic associative 
or retrieval processes: conducting an appraisal or "meaning" analysis 
would require the involvement of higher level cognitive processes which 
are ordinarily reserved for events of more importance. 
On some occasions, mood may affect us in a different way, via so-
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called controlled cognitive processes. These are times when the presence 
of the mood becomes a factor in conscious decision-making or problem 
solving. The specific instances discussed by Clark and lsen (1982) are 
self-regulatory in nature; that is, people in good moods make decisions 
designed to protect their mood from an impending negative event or 
people in bad moods think or behave in ways designed to "repair" their 
moods. However, it seems that one could just as easily offer a simple 
threshold explanation for these phenomenon. 
Resource Allocation Models 
According to the resource allocation or capacity model explicated by 
Ellis and Ashbrook (1988), there is a limited amount of attentional 
capacity within the individual, and this is divided when two or more 
tasks are engaged in simultaneously. Consequently, information or 
material which does not require great processing demands (and hence is 
easily processed) can be expected to result in less consistent mood 
effects. So, for example, material which has been essentially over-
learned (e.g., childhood memories) will not be greatly affected by mood's 
influence. The same also holds true for highly meaningful or highly 
organized materials. In those situations, however, in which processing 
demands are relatively great, the theory predicts that we should observe a 
more pronounced impact of mood on memory. This prediction is similar 
to that made by Bower's theory in relation to such over-learned items. 
The mechanisms, as described, are slightly different, though perhaps not 
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incompatible. The Ellis and Ashbrook model makes three primary 
assumptions to account for the effects of emotional states on memory: 
( 1) emotional states produce their effects on cognitive activities by 
regulating the amount of capacity available to be allocated to a given 
task; (2) the encoding of information usually requires some allocation of 
cognitive capacity or effort; and (3) memory performance is frequently 
correlated with the amount of capacity allocated to the cognitive task 
(Ellis & Ashbrook, 1989). 
The resource allocation approach to mood and memory issues differs 
from semantic network and schema theories primarily in its focus upon 
the allocation of attentional capacity. Network and schema theories are 
generally more concerned with how current memory organization affects 
the processing of information in memory. What all these theories share 
in common, however, and a crucial way in which they differ from Logical 
Learning Theory, is their focus upon energic conceptions as a 
foundational notion. Both the spreading of "activation" and the 
appropriation of "attention" eschew the primacy of the Logos in favor of 
what appear to be Bios conceptions. 
Because the resource allocation model will not be discussed further 
here, we give two brief examples of research from this perspective. 
Results consistent with this hypothesis were found by Hasher, Rose, 
Zacks, Sanft, and Doren (1985), who found no evidence for mood 
congruence effects (an otherwise reliable phenomenon) when they 
presented subjects with narrative passages during learning and then 
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tested for recall of these passages. According to this theory, highly 
organized narrative passages should have been relatively impervious to 
mood effects. A study carried out by Ellis, Thomas, and Rodriguez ( 1984) 
also clearly supported the notion of resource allocation. They employed 
a sentence-completion task with varying levels of difficulty, such that 
some of the sentences required a great deal of effort to complete, while 
others were comparatively easy. They found that depressed subjects had 
more difficulty recalling the portions of the difficult task, but not so for 
the easy task. This is as would be predicted by the Ellis and Ashbrook 
( 1988) model, which hypothesizes that depressed states will have their 
greatest impact on tasks which place a heavy emphasis on encoding. 
CHAPTERS 
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
In most of the recent discussions of mood and memory research, the 
predominant view has been that the effects of emotion-inducing events 
are dependent on changes in emotion per se. However, there is now 
considerable evidence that emotion as a subjective feeling state may 
often be unrelated to differences in recall. While an emotional state may 
be particularly salient after exposure to a mood-induction, it does not 
necessarily follow that the emotion per se has caused the patterning of 
subsequent recall. While some alternative explanations argue that the 
immediate effects of the induction may also include the priming of 
cognitive schemas and conceptual categories (e.g., Bower [ 19811 or Isen 
[ 1982]), this is not the perspective adopted by Logical Learning Theory. 
In what follows, it will be argued that the LLT conception of affective 
assessment can adequately account for the familiar, replicable findings 
in the mood and memory area, as well as for many findings not explained 
by theories which make some form of emotional "arousal" the mediating 
variable. 
The Effects of Mood on Perception and Judgment 
There is a fair amount of literature consisting of studies in which 
moods are either induced or existing affect is measured and the effect on 
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some perception or judgment is assessed. According to Morris (1987), the 
evidence from these studies tends to confirm popular wisdom that mood 
does influence how things look to us. He notes that although that 
influence is most often mood congruent, there is some variability with 
regard to positive and negative affective states--precisely in accord with 
the many and varied findings on affective assessment mentioned above. 
For example, past research has found that while individuals in positive 
moods show increased helping and attraction toward others, the effects 
of negative mood are more inconsistent. According to Logical Learning 
Theory such findings are a result of the precedent-sequacious lines of 
meaning extension taking place in each particular case. That is, the 
affective assessment which is rendered sequaciously "colors" the 
experiences to follow, determining the subjective meaning or quality 
which they will have for the individual. This evaluation is rendered over 
and above what is actually taking place in experience, for this is the 
nature of affective assessment--which is a transcending telosponse. This 
is a logical--and not a biological--determinism. It is worth noting that 
the findings of many of the studies to be reported here are similar to 
those mentioned in the section on LLT, despite the general lack of a 
mood manipulation in the latter works. This is taken as further support 
for the notion that both mood and emotion are not "states" of 
activation, but rather logical extensions of meaning in precedent-
sequacious fashion. 
59 
Mood and subjective evaluations. In one of the more well-known 
studies to be done in this area, Alice Isen and her colleagues (Isen, 
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978, Study 1) induced positive mood in a 
shopping mall by giving a small promotional gift to individuals who 
passed by. These persons were stopped a short time later and asked to 
participate in what was, ostensibly, a consumer satisfaction survey of 
their televisions and automobiles. In contrast to a control group 
comprised of individuals from the mall who had not received gifts, the 
experimental group reported more favorable perceptions of both their 
televisions and automobiles. Isen (1975) has suggested, in accord with 
such theories of spreading activation as that proposed by Anderson and 
Bower ( 1973 ), that the effects of positive and negative moods on behavior 
result from the relative availability of mood congruent thoughts. This is 
thought to occur through a sort of "priming" of congruent memories, 
which are theorized as being located near one another within the 
"semantic network." That is, when a given event is activated by some 
external occurrence, other nearby nodes are similarly "activated," thereby 
increasing the likelihood that a given memory will cross the limen of 
consciousness. This notion is suggestive of a drive conception, and 
hence is incompatible with Logical Learning Theory. 
In a second experiment, Isen et al. (1978) induced positive or negative 
mood by having subjects win or lose while playing a video game. While 
subjects in the positive mood condition (those who won while playing the 
video game) recalled more positive traits from a list of personality trait 
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words presented previously, those who lost the video game were no more 
likely to recall negative than positive words. Again, we find individuals 
in positive moods recalling a greater number of mood congruent items 
than those in negative moods. While the presence of positive mood may, 
in both cases, have contributed to a greater availability of mood 
congruent thoughts, Logical Learning Theory would contend that it is 
not the increased availability of thoughts per se which determines mood, 
but rather the broader context of meaning (positive or negative) 
predicated of the situation in general, and then extended into lived 
experience. 
In order to provide further support to Isen's notion that mood 
differentially affects the availability of mood-congruent items, Clark and 
Waddell ( 1983) tested the hypothesis that mood states would 
differentially impact on the accessibility of mood congruent thoughts in 
response to situations involving helping, attraction toward another 
person, and the acquisition of information. After having experienced 
either a positive, negative, or no mood induction, subjects were asked to 
imagine themselves in situations in which (a) helping was possible, (b) 
they were to meet a blind date, and (c) they had the opportunity to 
acquire free brochures. Free associations were then given to each 
situation. Those subjects who were induced to feel good had 
significantly more positive first affective associations to situations in 
which helping was possible and to the occasion of meeting a blind date 
than did subjects in either the control or negative mood conditions. 
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Subjects induced to feel bad had more negative first affective 
associations to all three situations than did other subjects, though these 
differences were not significant. In a similar vein, children with a 
positive or "happy" outlook have been found to be more helpful to others 
than children who have a negative or "unhappy" outlook (Strayer, 1980). 
In order to assess the possibility that mood might also affect our 
perceptions of others, Izard et al. (1965) manipulated mood and then 
examined how this influenced resolutions of binocularly rivalrous 
stimuli. Relevant affect (positive or negative) was created by having the 
experimenter be either pleasant or unpleasant. The pleasant 
experimenter would, for example, praise the subject's performance in an 
attempt to create a warm and supportive relationship, whereas the 
unpleasant experimenter was critical of the subject's performance, 
calling into question the individual's abilities. Izard et al. 's dependent 
measure consisted of the way in which subjects subsequently resolved 
the stereoscopic rivalries which were created by displaying pairs of 
photographs in a stereoscope. These photographic pairs contained 
either a happy or an angcy expression of the same individual, or two 
pictures of an interpersonal scene involving two people, one scene 
showing a hostile and the other a friendly interaction. When subjects 
were asked to report what they saw, there were significant differences for 
both kinds of stimuli: that is, the subjects exposed to an unpleasant 
experimenter were apt to see more hostile faces and interactions than 
subjects who had been exposed to a pleasant experimenter. 
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Mood and expectancy. Johnson and Tversky (1983) examined the 
role of mood on expectations of positive and negative future events. 
After manipulating mood by having subjects read newspaper stories 
which reported death by either leukemia, homicide, or fire (a control 
condition which did not involve death was also included), subjects were 
asked to fill out a questionnaire on which they indicated their level of 
concern for each of 18 causes of death. As predicted, they found that the 
stories about the deaths had the effect of creating a more negative mood 
among the experimental subjects than among those in the control 
condition. In addition, they reported an increased concern over death by 
the 18 means as a whole (an increased "global" concern). Surprisingly, 
they found no increase in the level of concern for the "target" cause, that 
is, the cause about which they had just read. This finding poses 
problems for associative and semantic network theories. According to 
such accounts, exposure to a negative event of some sort (i.e., a death) 
should lead to the spreading of activation to those nodes closely related 
to this event, leading to the propensity for a greater negative reaction to 
this particular type of event: in other words, events that are closely 
related to the story should be influenced to a greater extent that those 
which are unrelated. According to LLT, however, the affective assessment 
rendered (positive or negative) is broader in scope than the event of 
interest per se. Hence, it is not surprising to find this meaning-
extension being predicated of several of the available alternatives. 
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According to Schwarz and Clore (1983), evaluative decisions which 
are rendered may be "mistakenly" based upon the affective state or mood 
which one is in while making such judgments. To test this, they 
performed two experiments looking at the role of mood-related factors 
upon judgments of happiness and satisfaction with one's life. They 
postulated that mood would have a differential impact on the subjects' 
ratings of well-being depending upon whether or not they were made 
conscious of the possible influence mood might have. In the first 
experiment, moods were induced by asking subjects to provide vivid 
descriptions of happy or sad events which had recently occurred in their 
lives. In order to isolate the effect of mood, the experiment was run in 
"an unusual soundproof room" (Schwarz and Clore, 1983, p. 515), with 
some subjects being told that the room had the general effect of making 
subjects feel good, while others were told the reverse (i.e., that the room 
would make them feel bad). The experimenters reasoned that in making 
subjects aware of the possible causes of their moods, they would become 
less likely to be influenced by these states; in contrast, when subjects 
were not made aware of their moods, the usual mood-congruent 
judgments were expected. As expected, subjects who were not cued as to 
the possible influence of their mood made life-satisfaction judgments in 
a mood-congruent direction, while those who were made aware did not 
display a similar effect. 
Here again, we have evidence of precedent-sequacious cognitive 
processing taking place. In this case, the researchers have capitalized on 
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the fact that if subjects are given a plausible precedent (i.e., that their 
moods may "mistakenly" affect their judgments), they will sequaciously 
extend this meaning into ongoing behavior (Rychlak, 1994, p. 97). This 
is reminiscent of the research mentioned above involving the notions of 
"einstellung" and "aufgabe." The aufgabe (the experimenter's predication 
via task instruction) has once again established an einstellung 
(predicating bias) for the subject under study, a bias which is then 
extended into the results of the experiment. This study is 
"contaminated," therefore, by the fact that the observed results may have 
less to do with mood per se, than with the willingness of research 
subjects to comply with the perceived demands (demand characteristics) 
of the experiment. 
Mood Induction Research 
The research into the relationship between mood/ emotion and 
memory has expanded greatly in recent years, to the point that there are 
now journals dealing specifically with such topics. Within this area, 
however, much of the thinking remains what we have called 
"mediational," or essentially non-teleological. Intimations of drive 
theory can be found in, for example, the network theory of Bower ( 1981, 
see above), in which discrete brain units are "activated" to some 
threshold level, causing the effects on memory observed in the 
experimental context. 
In the majority of the research on mood and memory, it has been 
65 
found that mood does have some influence on what is learned and/or 
recalled in subsequent memory tasks. According to Logical Learning 
Theory (LLT), this is as it should be, for as we have said, it is when 
someone has affirmed a precedent meaning (e.g., like or dislike) that we 
see this meaning being sequaciously extended into lived experience. And 
so we find that positive moods facilitate the recall of positive material, 
with the reverse generally occurring with material of a negative sort (as 
rated idiographically by the individual, of course). All findings of this 
sort are consistent with the precedent-sequacious style of explanation 
that LLT advocates. A "mood" is clearly a context meaning that is 
predicated by the person involved. It is worth noting that idiographic 
differences were not simply overlooked by the Lockean theorists. Though 
they realized that people had unique idiographic associations to 
learnable items, the way in which these unique organizations functioned 
was taken to be identical to the way in which the nomothetic measures 
functioned: all learning and memory was seen to involve associative 
strengths based upon the frequency and contiguity of verbal inputs, 
organized externally and carried along in the mediated process. It did 
not make sense, from this perspective, to single out such idiographic 
factors. 
In this section we examine more of what has been discovered 
empirically about the relationship between mood and memory. The 
predicted effects of mood on memory vary to some degree depending upon 
the theory being put to test. For example, the resource allocation model 
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of Ellis and Ashbrook (1989) predicts that the experience of a negative 
mood will interfere with the performance of any task, including memory 
tasks, particularly as the demands for "processing" become greater. Yet 
another possibility is that mood will selectively bias or distort memory in 
some way. Thus, the mood and memory perspective adopted by Bower 
(1981) assumes that the way an experience is encoded for storage in 
long-term memory is largely determined by the encoder's mood state at 
the time of encoding. According to this view, the mood consists of a 
number of elements, all of which go together to form a context which can 
subsequently be "reactivated." Logical Learning Theory, in 
contradistinction to these theories, holds that it is context qua 
predication which is most important for the recall of relevant 
information. Thus, LLT argues that affective assessments will play the 
greatest role in determining recall in those instances in which this can 
be observed. 
Those studies involving mood manipulations have typically applied 
variations on a number of common techniques, including (a) the Velten 
( 1968) technique, (b) hypnosis, (c) success/failure experiences, (d) 
musical mood induction procedures, (e) posturing, and (fl a "memory 
elicitation" technique (Blaney, 1986, p. 235). One advantage of such 
mood induction techniques is that they aid in overcoming problems of 
selection bias; that is, they allow for random assignment of subjects to 
conditions. 
The Velten procedure remains one of the more validated methods for the 
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induction of mood states, with numerous researchers finding psychomotor 
speed or activation being positively correlated with moods induced via this 
procedure. A potential drawback of this and other mood inductions is seen in 
evidence which suggests that the duration of the effects of mood inductions 
are usually brief. Specifically, there is evidence that the affective 
consequences of mood manipulations are normatively quite brief (Frost 
& Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Ranieri & Ziess, 1984). This 
may be seen as calling into question the utility of post-test measures of 
the effectiveness of a given mood induction. Memory elicitation, a related 
technique which involves the recollection of relevant memories by subjects, 
also enjoys some popularity among researchers. Though originally developed 
for work with children, this procedure has also been used successfully with 
adults (Morris, 1989). Morris has said with regard to such procedures: "Recall, 
though a different 'medium' than perception, presents the same 
possibilities ... Not only is there little doubt that affect can be generated through 
recall as well as other thought processes such as imagining but, in addition, 
there is good reason to suppose that the most likely result would be a mood-like 
state" (p. 26). 
In the following sections, we examine what has been found in the two 
most prominent areas of the mood and memory literature: mood state 
dependent memory and mood congruent memory. 
Mood state dependent memory. According to the mood state 
dependent retrieval hypothesis, what an individual is able to retrieve 
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from memory when in a given mood is dependent to some degree upon 
what the individual learned when previously in that mood. That is, in 
network theoretical terms, the more similar the network "activation" 
(qua drive} entailed by the prevailing context is to the encoding context 
of the material to be recalled, the more likely will the person be to recall 
what was learned when previously in the same mood state. Bower, 
Monteiro, and Gilligan ( 1978} have spoken of this as "endogenous state-
dependent retention" (p. 573}. In cases such as these, the affective 
valence (positive, negative, or neutral} of the material learned is not 
expected to be of importance. While mood congruence effects are 
possible both during encoding and retrieval, state dependent memory 
effects require mood manipulation on two separate occasions, and hence 
are more concerned with retrieval effects. The evidence for this 
phenomenon, however, is somewhat equivocal and open to alternative 
interpretation. 
Some support for the mood state dependent retrieval hypothesis was 
obtained in a non-laboratory setting by Weingartner, Miller, and Murphy 
( 1977}, who studied manic-depressive inpatients. Subjects were asked to 
generate word associations on one occasion, and then to try and recall 
them four days later. As would be predicted by the mood state dependent 
hypothesis, recall for the material was related to the degree of mood 
change exhibited by the subjects, with those subjects undergoing greater 
levels of mood change recalling less of the relevant material. In this 
experiment, however, we run into a conceptual problem which is to be 
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found in much of the research in the area of mood and memory (Blaney, 
1986): it is possible that these effects are better explained in terms of a 
mood congruity hypothesis. That is, from the perspective such as 
Bower's (1981) semantic network theory, though greater recall was 
associated with increased similarity of moods across the four day period, 
it is possible that the material recalled was "activated" by the nature of 
the material itself, and not the similarity of mood states across 
occasions. In LLT terms, the affective assessment of the material 
rendered by the individual was congruent with the material recalled, 
leading to a sequacious facilitation of recall in the Logos. 
Another ostensible example of mood state dependent memory in a 
non-laboratory setting was reported by Bower (1981), and involved the 
case of Sirhan Sirhan, the man who, in 1968, assassinated Bobby 
Kennedy. After he was apprehended, Sirhan initially claimed that he did 
not remember committing the murder. When placed under hypnosis, 
however, and made to relive the events of that day, Sirhan became 
greatly agitated--and only then was able to recall the events. Bower 
(1981) notes: 
Under hypnosis, as Sirhan became more worked up and excited, he 
recalled progressively more, the memories tumbling out while his 
excitement built to a crescendo leading up to the shooting. At 
that point Sirhan would scream out the death curses, "fire" the 
shots, and then choke as he reexperienced the Secret Service 
bodyguard nearly throttling him after he was caught. (p. 129) 
As suggested above with regard to the creating of an emotional reaction, 
it is through the extension of relevant meanings that this process is 
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facilitated. In the case of Sirhan, this conceptual reframing of a relevant 
circumstance was aided by the use of hypnosis. In other words, Sirhan 
was facilitated in bringing to bear currently "unused" or "unrecognized" 
premises from out of an "unseen" region of mind. 
Yet, as suggested above, evidence of mood state dependent retrieval 
has not always been easy to find. In some of his initial work in this 
area, Bower (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978) was unable to find 
support for this effect. College-age subjects were placed in either happy 
or sad moods and then were asked to memorize a single list of 16 or 20 
words. When recall was tested either 10 minutes or 24 hours later, there 
was no main effect of induced mood, although subjects in the longer 
retention interval recalled fewer words. This latter finding is as would be 
expected, since as "time" moves along many and varied predications 
continue to be made, sometimes altering the initial rendering of an 
object or event. The failure to find mood state dependent retrieval, 
however, detracts from the notion of an "activated" context. A similar 
failure to find state dependent effects when using a single list 
noninterference paradigm was reported by Nasby and Yando (1982). This 
study, however, unlike that of Bower et al. ( 1978) employed children as 
subjects. Bower and his associates explained this effect as resulting 
from the distinctiveness of the single list, such that subjects could 
retrieve the same number of words whether placed in the same or an 
altered mood. That is, increased activation of retrieval cues did not 
affect subsequent recall. 
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Despite this failure to find state dependence using the single-list 
paradigm. Bower and his colleagues ( 1978) were able to find supportive 
evidence in a different portion of their study. This part of their study 
employed a within-session recall task with elated or depressed mood 
inductions. They had their experimental subjects learn two lists--one 
while happy and the other while sad--and then recall in either an elated 
or depressed mood. Control subjects learned both word lists in either an 
elated or depressed mood state, then also recalled in a similar state. 
Compared to the control subjects, those subjects in the experimental 
condition showed a facilitation of memory for words learned in the same 
mood, but interference on those words learned in the opposite mood. 
Again we have here the possibility of a mood congruent learning effect, so 
that it is unclear just what these results suggest. 
More consistent evidence for mood-state-dependent retrieval can be 
found in those studies which require subjects to recall happy or sad 
experiences while in either happy or sad moods. In such experiments, 
retrieval is believed to be state dependent because the material recalled is 
presumed to have been learned in the same mood as that induced in the 
experimental context. Once again, however, the LLT advocate is free to 
argue that it is the sequacious extension of congruent meaning that 
"accounts for" such effects. Madigan and Bollenbach ( 1982). for 
example, used the Velten (1968) procedure to induce elated, depressed, 
and neutral moods in their subjects, then tested in separate experiments 
the positivity of personal memories and the positivity of free 
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associations. They found in their first two expertnients that subjects in 
the elation condition recalled more memories of a pleasant nature than 
subjects in the depressed condition. In the third experiment of their 
study, subjects in the elated condition recalled a greater number of 
pleasant memories than subjects in the depressive condition. 
Forgas, Bower, and Krantz (1984) used hypnotic induction to induce 
elated and depressed moods in subjects, then examined the amount 
recalled with regard to the stressfulness or comfortableness of previous 
experiences. They found that their depressively induced subjects recalled 
more about their stressful experiences, while the elation induced 
subjects recalled more of their comfortable experiences. Though these 
studies have been discussed in terms of state dependence, it is again 
possible that they arise from mood congruence effects. That is, the 
affective valence of the material recalled is generally congruent with the 
ongoing mood state, so that the effects of each cannot be adequately 
separated. However, such findings are in the direction which would be 
predicted by LLT. 
Mood congruence. Mood congruence refers to the finding that 
people will generally encode more information which is congruent than 
incongruent with their ongoing mood. Here we find one of the main 
differences between studies of mood congruent and state dependent 
memory, at least with regard to methodology. In contrast to studies 
which are designed to examine mood state dependent retrieval, studies of 
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mood congruity do not require subjects to experience a given mood on 
two separate occasions. And, whereas the research findings for mood 
state dependent retrieval remain open to question, the findings on mood 
congruence have been more robust (Blaney, 1986). In terms of Bower's 
(1981) network theory, affective state acts to render more salient those 
emotional characteristics in the environment which are consistent with 
an individual's emotional state. However, such findings are also 
consistent with the Logical Learning Theory contention that mood states 
are not akin to "drive" states which can be "activated" on the analogy of 
an electrical circuit. Once again, it is of the nature of "logical" meaning-
extension to find such effects--not a biological activation of some sort. 
It is assumed by network theories such as Bower's (1981) that mood 
states can act as cues for selective recall of mood-congruent information 
(mood-congruent retrieval). Thus, it may for example be expected that 
pleasant memories will be more easily retrieved than negative or neutral 
memories when the person is in a positive mood at the time of recall. A 
similar but conceptually distinct aspect of mood congruent memory 
involves the selective encoding of new information (mood-congruent 
encoding). In this case, mood states supposedly influence the salience 
and selective encoding of new mood-congruent information, resulting in 
better retention and recall of that information. Although the mood-
based conceptualization appears theoretically sound, key predictions 
have not been upheld. Most of the confirmatory findings involve the 
selective advantages of encoding or retrieving mood-congruent 
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information. 
Johnson, Petzel, Hartney, and Morgan (1983), for example, 
performed a study examining the memory of depressed and nondepressed 
undergraduate subjects. Specifically, they looked at memory for tasks 
which subjects had been asked to perform, and which they had been 
either successful or unsuccessful in completing. Subjects were led to 
believe that whether or not they completed these tasks was under their 
control. In fact, however, the experimenters had set up the experiment 
so that all subjects performed equally with regard to success or failure. 
They found, as they had predicted, that depressed subjects subsequently 
recalled more of their uncompleted tasks, while nondepressed subjects 
recalled more of their completed tasks. Similar to these results are the 
findings of Roth and Rehm (1980) who found that depressed inpatients 
were more interested in examining instances of their failures than 
psychiatric controls. In both instances the task at hand was predicated 
negatively, with negative or disliked meaning being extended 
sequaciously to the contents under "processing." 
A frequently cited work of particular interest for the present work is a 
study done by Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro ( 1981 ). These researchers 
hypnotized subjects to feel either happy or sad before having them read a 
story about two fictional characters. The characters, Jack and Andre, 
each experienced a number of either unhappy or happy events. After a 
delay of 24 hours, subjects returned and were asked to recall, now in a 
neutral mood, as much of the story as possible. They found that those 
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subjects who had been placed in sad moods recalled a greater number of 
facts about sad Jack than happy Andre, while those in the elation 
condition recalled more facts about happy Andre then sad Jack. There 
was no significant relationship between mood and the total number of 
facts (both positive and negative) recalled. This study is important in 
having examined the effect of mood at encoding (mood-congruence), 
without confounding the issue of state-dependent learning effects by 
manipulating mood also at recall. 
Evidence for mood-congruence has been discovered in paradigms in 
which subjects are asked to recall a list of positive or negative adjectives 
or events which they previously read or heard while in an induced mood. 
Typical induction procedures involve having subjects read lists of either 
positive or negative statements (Velten, 1968), or undergo hypnotic 
procedures (Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) in an attempt to induce 
the desired positive or negative moods. The rationale for such procedures 
is that by controlling the mood the subject experiences, any differential 
effects arising within the experimental context will be the result of mood 
and not other extraneous variables. What is typically found is that 
subjects in positive moods are more likely to recall (or recognize) positive 
adjectives, while those persons in negative moods are more likely to 
recall (or recognize) negative adjectives (Alexander & Guenther, 1986; 
Natale & Hantas, 1982; Nasby & Yando, 1982). 
Another interesting test of the mood-congruity hypothesis was done 
by Clark and Teasdale (1985), and yielded differential results for males 
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and females. That is. while there was no evidence for mood-congruity 
effects among the males participating in the experiment, the females. did 
show the effect in relation to affectively-toned personality trait words 
and abstract nouns. They discovered in a later portion of their 
experiment that the females were significantly more likely to have 
employed the materials of interest at some time in the past. Similar 
were the results of an experiment carried out by Einstein and Ellis 
( 1987), in which they examined the recall of depressed males and females 
for either fairy tales or technically-oriented material. They found that 
the depressed females recalled the technically-oriented passages more 
poorly than neutral mood controls, but the same did not hold true for 
the fairy-tales. The depressed males, in contrast, showed a reverse 
pattern: that is, their recall of the technically-oriented materials was not 
significantly affected, though they showed poorer recall of the fairy-tales. 
Einstein and Ellis concluded that differential levels of past experience 
and "interest values" for the content of the passages was likely 
responsible for the observed effects. This notion of "interest value" is 
clearly an example of what LLT would call affective assessment, while the 
results themselves are akin to results reported by Rychlak, Tasto, 
Andrews, and Ellis (1973) in a study on the RV-positive effect. They 
showed in a study of college subjects who showed elevations on a 
measure of masculinity, that such subjects learned masculine words (but 
not their feminine words) according to an RV-positive effect in a free-
recall task. The reverse was found for female subjects, who showed an 
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RV-positive effect for the learning of feminine words. Finally, we 
conclude this section with a study designed specifically to investigate the 
relationship between mood-state dependent and mood-congruent 
memory, contrasting the outcomes predicted by each approach with what 
actually occurred. 
In a work designed to replicate the Bower et al. ( 1978) experiment 
discussed above, Lewis and Williams (1989) employed essentially the 
same design, but with some important additions. These authors 
approached the experiment. not from a nodal network theory perspective, 
but rather directly from the point of view of LLT. The primary goal of this 
experiment was to compare in one study both the mood state dependent 
memory effect and the mood-congruity effect. The former is 
fundamentally inconsistent with LLT, for as the authors point out, "The 
concept of state-dependent learning ... has always implied a 
fundamentally physiological explanation; the ability to retrieve memories 
is presumed to depend on the condition or 'state' of the central nervous 
system" (Lewis and Williams, 1989, p. 157). 
In seeking to further clarify the relationship between mood state-
dependent retrieval and mood-congruence effects, Lewis and Williams 
had subjects rate (affectively assess; see above) words from the Anderson 
( 1968) norms on a scale of likability with values ranging from "like 
much" and "like slightly," to "dislike slightly" and "dislike much." This 
provided an idiographic measure of individual subject word-preference, 
thus allowing them to look for potential mood-congruence effects within 
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the state-dependent retrieval effect. Lewis and Williams hypothesized 
that subjects would indeed show a mood-state-dependent retrieval effect, 
but that this effect would be due to a mood congruity effect not apparent 
in the earlier Bower et al. (1978) study. 
As hypothesized, Lewis and Williams found that when a list was 
facilitated in recall as indicated by a congruence between mood at 
learning and mood at recall, the recall advantage was manifest only as 
mood-congruent recall. In other words, when a word list is favored in 
recall by a negative mood, the facilitation of recall only occurs for words 
which the subjects have rated as disliked; similarly, when a word list 
which has been learned is favored in recall by a positive mood, the 
increased recall involves words the subjects have rated as liked. This 
study, while not altogether incompatible with the mood state dependent 
retrieval effect hypothesized by Bower (1981), does render such an 
account incomplete by calling into question the true nature of nodal 
"activation." From the perspective of such a theory, there should not 
have been differences in the numbers of liked and disliked words recalled 
in the varying experimental conditions, since each subject had the 
opportunity to learn and recall an equal number of liked and disliked 
words. More importantly, it provides increased evidence for the value of 
the mood congruity hypothesis, and the precedent-sequacious nature of 
meaning-extension posited by LLT. As Lewis and Williams ( 1989) state: 
The favorable effect of matching moods during learning and recall 
appears to depend on the subject's ability to extend meaning to 
experience in fundamentally different ways, rather than on the 
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experimenter's ability to induce fundamentally different "states." 
Put another way, the mood-dependent retrieval effect reflects more 
of what we commonly refer to as a "state of mind" than it reflects 
what some people call a "brain state." The "context" upon which 
memory is dependent is logical and meaningful rather than 
structural or associationistic." (p. 168) 
Mood asymmetry and mood incon"ruity. Thus far we have 
examined the research in light of an associative network theory of 
memory, which predicts that mood will prime those memories with which 
it is associated, thus leading to mood congruent recall. However, there 
is some evidence that the mood congruity hypothesis, by itself, is not 
sufficient to explain all the empirical findings. That is, under some 
conditions an asymmetrical mood effect or even a mood incongruity 
effect may occur. For example, though the associative network theories 
(e.g., Bower, 1981) would predict symmetrical mood-congruent and 
mood-state-dependent effects, such effects are not always found. That 
is, the effects of sadness on negative material are not always the same as 
the effects of happiness or elation on positive material. Though this has, 
in fact, been the case, the study of this effect does not have the rich 
empirical framework found with the study of mood congruence or state 
dependence. As we shall see, most of the substantial efforts to isolate 
this effect have been of fairly recent origin. 
One of the patterns of results of interest here, notably asymmetrical 
mood effects, was early noted by Clark and lsen (1982). Specifically, they 
recognized that though good and bad moods were believed to be 
opposites, their effects on memory processes did not always reflect such a 
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hypothesized relationship. A number of studies have now made the 
general point that while positive mood inductions facilitate the recall of 
positive memories, negative mood induction does not always make the 
recall of negative memories more likely (lsen, 1985). 
Forgas and Moylan (1987), for example, obtained an asymmetrical 
mood effect; that is, they found a lack of an effect for negative mood, but 
a rather strong effect for positive mood in a study looking at the effects 
of mood-inducing movies. The authors state: 
This study was successful in demonstrating that exposure to 
various motion pictures generates strong and demonstrable mood 
effects in people, and that these moods in turn have a significant 
influence on a wide variety of thematically unrelated social 
judgments. We found positive mood effects to be more general and 
powerful than negative mood effects. The findings may be regarded 
as consistent with the predictions of recent mood-cognition 
theories, such as Bower's (1981) and Clark and Isen's (1982) 
models, and represent an ecologically valid extension of some 
earlier laboratory and field experiments demonstrating mood 
effects on social judgments. (p. 4 76 ). 
These results, coming from what is taken here to be a competing 
paradigm, actually fall nicely in line with the results of previous research 
within the framework of LLT. Earlier we discussed research that 
demonstrated that adult patients given diagnoses such as schizophrenia, 
depression, and alcoholism, might collapse the learning superiority for 
positively assessed items, at times even in the direction of favoring 
negative items (Mosbacher, 1984; Rychlak, McKee, Schneider, & 
Abramson, 1971; Slife, Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984). These 
findings were, of course, also extended to elementary, high school, and 
college students with negative self-images (August & Rychlak, 1978; 
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August, Rychlak, & Felker, 1975: Rychlak, Carlsen, & Dunning, 1974), 
and high school students who were forced to perform a learning task that 
they disliked (Rychlak & Marcell, 1986, 1992). Asymmetry of mood, 
however, is still somewhat different than a mood incongruity effect. The 
latter involves not only a diminution of the traditional mood congruence 
effect, but an outright reversal. Such an effect, if shown to exist, poses 
greater problems for traditional network theories of affect and memory. 
Has such an effect been shown to exist? 
Parrott and Sabini ( 1990) performed a series of experiments to 
examine the possibility that mood incongruent recall occurs under some 
conditions. For example, subjects in bad moods might be expected to 
attempt "mood repair" by recalling material incongruent with their 
prevailing mood. They theorized, however, that standard laboratory 
conditions may not be conducive to finding a mood incongruence effect 
for two reasons. First, Parrott and Sabini speculated that under normal 
laboratory conditions, cooperative subjects might be inclined not to 
attempt mood repair if they suspected that doing so might hinder the 
purposes of the experimenter. And second, they speculated that 
laboratory procedures might semantically prime mood congruent 
memories and concepts, so that any initial tendencies toward mood-
congruent recall would be exaggerated. To investigate these and other 
hypotheses, Parrott and Sabini carried out a series of five experiments. 
The first two of these were quasi-experimental designs which examined 
the effect of mood on autobiographical memory in a field setting: the 
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latter three were carried out in the laboratory. 
In the first of their five studies, Parrott and Sabini ( 1990) employed a 
quasi-experimental design, and utilized what they called "a reliable 
elicitor of moods in the ecology of the undergraduate student: the return 
of the graded midterm exam." They handed back exams at the beginning 
of class, then proceeded to give a lecture on autobiographical memory. 
This lecture, not ostensibly related to the return of their midterm exams, 
included as part of a class demonstration a memory task in which 
students were asked to recall and record several autobiographical 
memories. For those students who agreed to participate in the 
experiment (participation was necessarily voluntary), Parrott and Sabini 
(1990) found that students who received good grades (and hence were 
assumed to be in good moods) recalled events that were significantly less 
positive and more negative than students who received poor grades (and 
hence were assumed to be in bad moods)--evidence for the mood 
incongruity effect. Interestingly, this effect, which could have been 
"mood repair," appeared only for the first of the three memories recalled 
by each student. 
In the second of their two quasi-experiments, Parrot and Sabini 
utilized another reliable elicitor of moods--the weather--to obtain the 
desired effects. One advantage of this design was that it afforded greater 
control over subject selection. Specifically, they interviewed and 
obtained autobiographical memories from subjects traveling to and from 
the entrance to a library during either sunny or cloudy days. They found 
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that subjects who were approached on sunny days (and hence were 
presumed to be in good moods) recalled memories that were generally 
more negative than those of subjects approached on cloudy days (and 
who were presumed to be in relatively worse moods). The effect obtained 
here was somewhat different from that obtained in the first study. The 
authors noted: 
This result only partly replicates the findings of the first study in 
that a mood incongruent bias was evident only with regard to the 
negative affect of the memory. Nevertheless, because there was 
once again no significant evidence of mood congruent recall, it 
seems justified to conclude that mood incongruent events were 
recalled in both studies. (Parrott & Sabini, 1990, p. 326) 
The results obtained by Parrot and Sabini (1990) in the first two of 
their experiments run counter to those generally found by other 
researchers (see Blaney, 1986; Singer & Salovey, 1988). The authors 
speculate that several factors may have facilitated such findings. One 
major difference between the mood inductions employed by Parrot and 
Sabini and other researchers was the fact that the latter subjects were 
not aware that their moods were relevant to the experiments. This is 
much in contrast to the Velten (1968) and hypnotic procedures, which 
ask subjects directly to alter their moods. Their finding held up in three 
subsequent laboratory experiments, which sought to render less 
plausible the hypotheses that ( 1) the type of memory might have been 
responsible for the mood incongruent effect, or that (2) the type of 
environment (laboratory or natural) was responsible. Ruling out this 
latter possibility would greatly increase the external validity of the 
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findings and would be suggestive of the directions which future research 
might take. 
The results of the experiments by Parrott and Sabini ( 1990) presented 
something of a challenge to the formulations of LLT. According to the 
LLT account. all the memories recalled should be congruent with the 
affirmed mood of the subject. For this reason, Wandrei (1993) undertook 
to examine more closely relevant aspects of this work. After examining 
the experimental designs employed in this research, several modifications 
suggested themselves. For example, rather than obtaining idiographic 
measures of subject memories, Parrott and Sabini had used two judges to 
independently rate the memories recalled by subjects. From the LLT 
perspective, such judgments are better made on an individual basis, so 
that more accurate (valid) measures of affective quality are obtained. 
Second, Parrott and Sabini apparently conceptualized positive and 
negative affect as independent constructs, measured separately on 
independent scales. This contrasts markedly with the LLT view of 
affection, from which perspective affection is a single dimension 
encompassing both positive and negative evaluations. In other words, 
"more happy" can be seen at once to imply "less sad," and "more sad" to 
imply "less happy" (Wandrei, 1993). 
The study carried out by Wandrei was designed as a partial 
replication of the Parrott and Sabini (1990) work. However, whereas the 
former study employed an essentially nomothetic measure of affective 
assessment, the latter obtained idiographic ratings of affective quality 
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from all subjects. Further, as noted above, this affective dimension was 
conceptualized--not as two separate dimensions--but rather as 
oppositional in nature, and measured accordingly. Wandrei predicted 
that mood congruence would be found when using idiographic measures 
of affective assessment, but that such effects would not be found when 
independent judges made the evaluations. What follows is a very brief 
look at some of her results. 
An unanticipated effect was found in the Wandrei ( 1993) study for the 
memory ratings of judges, such that differences were found in ratings of 
memories depending on the order in which they were recalled. These 
differences were significant when one pair of judges made independent 
ratings of positivity and negativity, while there was a trend toward 
significance when another pair of judges used a global measure of 
positivity/negativity. Further examination revealed that the main source 
of the order effect was, in both cases, a tendency for the first memory 
recalled to be more positively rated than the second in all groups. 
Wandrei proposes that LLT could explain the observation as the result of 
a naturally positive predication that subjects make when approaching a 
new task or target. This could facilitate the effects of a predication based 
on positive mood, and might inhibit to some extent the extension of 
negative meaning that comes from a negative predication or sad mood. It 
may therefore be that, in recalling memories, subjects continue to use a 
"positive background framework" that is even more basic than that which 
they generally take on in their affective mood state. The results of this 
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research were somewhat mixed, but a clear advantage for the subjects' 
idiographic ratings was found. In other words, such results were 
consistent with the LLT notion that conceptualization (predication) is a 
process by which meaning is extended from a broader realm of meaning 
to a narrower target. 
Literature Review: Conclusions 
Work on the interrelationships of mood and memory is changing to 
an extent that would have been difficult to foresee even a few years ago. 
New theoretical propositions are being offered, and some of these are a 
great deal more consistent with the LLT position than others of the 
theories we have examined. One such example has recently been pointed 
out by Costanzo and Hasher ( 1989), who question the more traditional 
conceptions of mood and memory (e.g .. Bower, 1981). We conclude this 
section with a quote from these authors, who state: 
(A] unidirectional relationship between affective and cognitive 
systems is typically assumed. As in much of the historical 
research on affect-cognition relationships, affective processes are 
viewed as interrupting, interfering with, or directing cognitive 
processes. This is true whether one employs a schematic, 
semantic network, or resource allocation perspective as a 
theoretical base. In all such formulations, cognitive and memorial 
processes are construed as dependent or outcome variables, while 
affective processes are typically manipulated or assessed as 
independent or moderator variables. Although this directional 
portrayal is ... plausible ... it is unlikely to provide a complete 
understanding of affective-cognitive inter-relationships. Indeed, 
based on clinical observation and theory ... there is good reason to 
think of affect as a secondary manifestation of an underlying 
cognitive process. 
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The Present Study 
As should now be clear, the results of a great number of the 
investigations into the relationship of mood and memory have yielded 
ambiguous results. From the perspective offered by LLT, much of this 
confusion arises from the manner in which the individual's contribution 
to knowing is construed by more traditional cognitive models. 
Mechanistic formulations do not take into consideration the unique 
meanings affirmed by the subjects under study. As indicated earlier, this 
is the case because such theories, based on such measures as frequency 
and contiguity, posit no unique role for individual affective factors. Yet, 
in failing to take such factors into consideration an important 
dimension of the individual's learning style is left out. As Lewis and 
Williams ( 1989) suggest: "If learning material is not assessed 
idiographically, then ambivalent, unstable, and eccentric affective 
valences may wash out the mood-dependent retrieval effect" (p. 168). 
The purpose of the present study is therefore to compare directly the 
relative influences of affective assessment and mood induction on 
memory performance. In doing so, we are assessing the contribution of 
the subject's idiographic rating of learnable materials as against the 
contribution made by an experimentally manipulated mood of the sort 
that is characteristic of many of the studies in this area (see Blaney, 
1986). The present study is similar in some respects to a study carried 
out by Teasdale and Russell (1983), in which the effect of induced mood 
on the recall of previously learned personality trait words was examined. 
88 
Personality trait words were here arrayed in three groups based on 
nomothetic averages from the Anderson (1968) norms, in order to control 
for association value (see above). These words were then presented to 
subjects for rating either before or after positive, negative, or neutral 
mood induction. The inclusion of a control group was designed to assess 
whether, for example, positive mood actually facilitates the retrieval of 
positive words, and I or whether negative mood disrupts the retrieval of 
positive words. Evidence cited above indicated that the affective 
consequences of mood manipulations are usually quite brief. This 
suggests that effective manipulation checks would be those that occurred 
immediately or shortly after the conclusion of the induction. However, 
this would then leave uncertain whether the induction effects would 
persist into the crucial portions of the experiment, in the present study, 
the recall and recognition tasks presented to each subject. For this 
reason, the present study has not included a mood manipulation check. 
Rather than interrupting subjects as they move from the induction to 
the rating task or from the induction to the memory tasks and having 
them rate their moods, we have instead chosen to combine two of the 
more effective mood induction techniques on the assumption that they 
will be effective in eliciting the desired moods in the experimental groups. 
The design of this experiment places the predictions of LLT directly 
against those of Bower's (1981) nodal network theory of emotion. From 
the perspective of the latter, emotion is a node within the associative 
network which, when activated beyond a certain threshold, triggers 
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related or associated nodes. From the perspective of Logical Learning 
Theory, affection is the ability of the individual to transcend ongoing 
cognition, evaluating the contents under processing as either liked 
(positive evaluation) or disliked (negative evaluation) in quality. This 
ability is not learned, and hence is not merely a content within a 
mediational process. Rather, the meanings precedently framed in such 
acts of cognition play a very basic role (indeed, the most basic role), 
sequaciously "coloring" what is to follow in thought. 
Hypotheses 
CHAPTER 6 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
1) Subjects asked to recall and recognize material that they have pre-
rated for affective assessment will be found to rely more on this 
idiographic measure than they will on the moods that they are 
induced to perform under in a recall and recognition task. 
2) The presence of a mood induction will interact with affection 
ratings, so that: (a) Subjects in the positive mood induction 
condition will show an advantage in the recall and recognition of 
liked over disliked words. (b) Subjects in the negative mood 
induction condition will show a diminution of the superiority of 
liked over disliked words in recall and recognition tasks. This will 
manifest itself in approximately equal levels of recall and 
recognition for both liked and disliked words. (c) Subjects in the 
neutral condition (no mood induction) should display an 
advantage in the recall and recognition of liked over disliked words. 
Rationale: 
Hypothesis I follows from the basic tenets of LLT discussed above. In 
a population of male and female college subjects, we presume that the 
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majority of such "well-adjusted" individuals will tend to predicate 
themselves and the task at hand positively, thereby leading to a 
facilitation in the learning of liked over disliked words. Such a 
prediction is based on the findings of Rychlak ( 1988 ), who has found in 
numerous studies that "normal subjects reflected the typical RV-positive 
effect in their learning performance" (p. 378). We therefore predict that 
the person's "natural" evaluation of the experimental context (i.e., a 
person's general or "background" mood) will provide a more personally 
relevant framework for organizing the experimental situation, including 
the information to be learned and remembered, than will the mood 
supposedly "activated" by traditional mood induction procedures. Put 
another way, the mood inductions employed in the present study will not 
"wash out" the more general or basic effects of affection. This follows 
from the fact that emotion or mood is not a "node" that can be activated, 
but rather an aspect of the predicational process per se. 
With regard to Hypothesis II, we have seen that predications must be 
fairly negative (mood negative, self-evaluation negative, etc.) before we 
diminish or flatten out the positive affective assessment effect (e.g., Slife, 
Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984; August & Rychlak, 1978; Rychlak & 
Marcell, 1986). Above we discussed a study involving high school 
students in which the factors of high or low self-image were crossed with 
ratings of "liking" or "disliking," and an enforced paired-associates 
learning task then performed. While neither of these factors by itself was 
sufficient to achieve a reversal, when subjects were negative in self-image 
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and forced to perform a disliked learning task, they did indeed learn 
significantly more disliked than liked eve trigrams (Rychlak & Marceil, 
1992). It is the organizing heuristic at the outset of learning that ensures 
solid learning and long-lasting memory rather than sheer repetition of 
such cognitions. Because the mood induction of interest here is provided 
externally, LLT would argue that this is not as salient a predicating 
framework as a "naturally" occurring mood state such as depression or 
even a hypnotic induction procedure of the sort used by Lewis and 
Williams (1989). This may be seen clearly in work with depressed 
individuals, who by definition are prone to see themselves and varying 
aspects of their world in negative terms. The results of studies such as 
these tend to be quite consistent, showing diminutions and even 
occasional outright reversals of the typical positive affection effect. 
There are two primary factors to be considered in an experimental 
task of the sort being examined here: the word ratings per se, and the 
mood context. Our goal is to challenge those Lockean or mediational 
forms of thinking which hold that people are manipulated by externals 
that direct them to learn one way or another (to recall and recognize one 
way or another) based on such manipulations. From this Lockean 
perspective, any role for their unique (idiographic) influences are 
considered, at best, secondary mediating factors. Affection, however, 
works at what has traditionally been called the point of "encoding." This 
is therefore not a question of "input," which might suggest that an 
already organized item is being "taken in" from an unpredicated external 
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source. From the LLT perspective, encoding is active organization, 
including affective assessments rendered by an evaluating intellect and 
brought to bear on what can and will then be "known." We thus want to 
see if mood induction has an effect over and above the idiographic 
ratings. In other words, does mood induction really counter the role of 




Student subjects were placed into one of three mood conditions, (a) 
an elated mood state, (b) a depressed mood state, or (c) a neutral mood 
state. The two mood induction conditions involved the use of a variation 
of the Velten ( 1968) mood induction procedure and the recall of a 
relevant personal experience to induce the desired mood. Control 
subjects remained in a neutral mood, performing a filler task that 
required them to solve anagram problems for a specified period of time. 
All subjects rated for likability a list of 60 words, and subsequently were 
given tests of recall and recognition to assess memory performance. 
Subjects 
Subjects came from the introductory psychology classes offered at 
Loyola University of Chicago's Lakeshore Campus during the Fall 
semester of 1992. Of 141 subjects initially brought into the experiment, 
137 provided useful data. Four subjects were eliminated from the 
Anagram conditions because of a failure to correctly follow the 
instructions. 
Materials 
The word list which all subjects rated contained a total of 60 words 
randomly selected from the Anderson (1968) norms. The list was 
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constructed in the following fashion: 20 words were randomly selected 
from the 100 most-liked words (e.g., happy, considerate), 20 from the 100 
least-liked (e.g., cold, lazy), and 20 from the neutral words ranked 
between 227 and 327 (e.g., scientific, conservative) on the list of 555 
personality trait words [see Appendix A for a listing of all relevant 
words]. This last group of words was assumed to represent an 
"ambivalent" sampling in terms of association value. The order of 
presentation of the words in the rating procedure was determined by 
assigning words using a random numbers table. The same order of 
presentation was subsequently used for all subjects. 
For the recognition portion of the experiment, an equal number of 
words was taken from the Anderson (1968) norms to act as distractor 
items. These words were chosen in the same manner as those above: 20 
words were randomly selected from the 100 most-liked words, 20 from the 
100 least-liked, and 20 from the neutral words ranked between 227 and 
327 on the list of 555 personality trait words. The order of presentation 
of the 120 words in the recognition condition was again determined by 
assigning words using a random numbers table. The same order of 
presentation was used for all subjects. None of the words appearing in 
the rating or recognition conditions appeared on the mood induction 
statements. 
Mood Induction 
The mood induction procedure was a modified version of that 
described by Velten ( 1968), as employed by Teasdale and Russell ( 1983) 
[see Appendix BJ. 
Anagram Task 
96 
Subjects in the anagram conditions were given forty anagrams on two 
pages, each anagram consisting of five scrambled letters (e.g., AT WR E 
= WATER). The time allotted for this portion of the experiment was 
equal to the amount of time subjects in the positive and negative mood 
induction conditions had to read the Velten statements and record a 
relevant memory (seven minutes). A complete list of the selected 
anagrams may be found in Appendix C. 
Ratings of Affective Assessment 
Subjects were presented with the 60 words selected from the Anderson 
( 1968) norms (see above). Twenty words were taken from each of the 
upper, middle, and lower third of these ratings. Subjects idiographically 
rated these words using a four-point scale consisting of the following 
choices: 1. Dislike Much, 2. Dislike Slightly, 3. Like Slightly, and 4. Like 
Much. Subjects were asked to select the item that corresponded most 
closely with his or her assessment of the word. The instructions asked 
subjects not to skip any items, making whatever choice seemed most 
appropriate. The relevant materials are presented in Appendix A. 
Experimental Design 
The present experiment required each subject to appear on one 
occasion only. The experimental design crossed three levels of encoding 
mood (Positive, Negative, and Neutral) with two levels of idiographic 
rating (Before or After mood induction) [see Table l ]. The anagram 
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Table 1. Experimental Design 
Part 1 Part2 Part 3 Part 4 
Group 1 Anagram RV Rating Recall Recognition 
Group 2 Pos. Mood RV Rating Recall Recognition 
Group 3 Neg. Mood RV Rating Recall Recognition 
Group 4 RV Rating Anagram Recall Recognition 
Group 5 RV Rating Pos. Mood Recall Recognition 
Group 6 RV Rating Neg. Mood Recall Recognition 
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groups represented a control condition in the present study. The list of 
words which subjects were asked to remember consisted of highly 
positive, negative, or neutral words according to the Anderson ( 1968) 
norms. 
Procedure 
Subjects were selected on a voluntary basis from the introductory 
psychology classes offered at Loyola University. The experiment was 
conducted in a single classroom with between three and seven subjects 
per trial. Moreover, all subjects in any given trial were placed in the 
same condition (one of three), (a) an elated mood state, (b) a depressed 
mood state, or (c) a neutral mood state. The two mood induction 
conditions involved using a variation of the Velten ( 1968) mood 
induction procedure, along with the recall of a relevant personal 
experience to induce the desired mood (see Appendix B). During each 
mood induction, subjects were asked to read through a set of twelve 
sheets of paper, each bearing one typed self-referent statement (e.g., 
positive mood induction: "I feel pretty good right now," "Right now, I feel 
like smiling"; negative mood induction: "I feel unhappy," "I feel 
downhearted and miserable"). Subjects were instructed to read through 
the cards and to attempt to experience the mood suggested by the 
statements. Following along the lines of the study by Teasdale and 
Russell ( 1983), subjects were instructed to proceed through the cards at 
a rate which would help them feel the mood suggested. The duration of 
this portion of the mood induction was seven minutes, allowing roughly 
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20 seconds per card. Subjects were then given three minutes to record a 
relevant memory on an accompanying sheet of paper. Control subjects 
remained in a neutral mood, performing a filler task requiring them to 
solve anagrams for a specified period of time (seven minutes). All 
subjects rated a list of words on a four-point likability scale: half in each 
condition (positive, negative, or anagram) before and the other half after 
the relevant induction/ anagram procedure. Following this portion of the 
experiment, all subjects were given sheets of paper containing 
instructions, which were also read aloud (see Appendix D), and given two 
minutes to recall as many words as possible from the first portion of the 
experiment (i.e., the words which had been rated for likability). At the 
end of this time recall sheets were collected, following which the 
recognition forms were distributed and the accompanying instructions 
read aloud (see Appendix E). Subjects were allowed to work on these for 
four minutes before being told that when finished they could turn in 
their sheets and receive credit for the experiment. Upon completing the 
task, subjects were debriefed and dismissed. 
Formulation of Scores for Data Analysis 
To examine the relative contributions of affective assessment and 
mood induction, there were four dependent measures in the present 
study: (a) the percentage of positively and negatively evaluated words 
recalled by each subject, and (b) the percentage of positively and 
negatively evaluated words recognized by each subject. These values were 
adjusted to reflect the percentage of such recalled and recognized words 
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that fell in the liked versus disliked designations (based on the 
idiographic ratings made of the words by each subject). No distinction 
was drawn between those words rated "Like Much" and "Like Slightly" or 
between those rated "Dislike Slightly" and "Dislike Much." This follows 
from previous research on affective assessment (see Rychlak, 1988, Chap. 
9). 
The actual methods used to tabulate the relevant data are discussed 
below. In Part I. the derivation of the recall percentage scores for both 
positive and negative words is examined. In Part II, a similar format is 
followed in the examination of the recognition scores. It should be noted 
that the percent recall and recognition scores were subjected to an 
arcsine transformation--in order to equate for distance between data 
points--before undergoing analyses of statistical significance. The means 
and standard deviations presented in the tables, however, reflect the 
original untransformed percentage scores. Individual raw scores as well 
as transformed raw scores are presented in Appendix F. 
Recall Score Derivation. In order to examine the levels of recall for 
positive and negative words in the six conditions of the experiment, the 
following procedure was employed: As a first step, the total number of 
words--from the initial list of 60--rated liked and disliked was calculated 
for each subject. This involved collapsing together those words rated as 
"Like Slightly" and "Like Much" to form one category of "Liked" words, 
and collapsing together those words rated as "Dislike Slightly" and 
"Dislike Much" to form a similar "Disliked" category. So, for example, a 
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subject might rate 40 of the 60 words as liked, and 20 as disliked. Next, 
those words actually recalled by each subject in the Recall portion of the 
experiment were sorted in similar fashion into categories of "Liked" and 
"Disliked" words. Our hypothetical subject might then recall 15 of the 
words which were rated, 10 of them liked and 5 of them disliked. 
The scores to be used in the omnibus analysis of variance test were 
then derived in a third step. For each subject, the number of words rated 
positively or negatively (calculated above) was employed as the 
denominator of a fraction, with the actual number of words recalled 
serving as the numerator. This procedure formed a ratio score which 
took into consideration the relative percentages of words rated positively 
and negatively across subjects. These scores could theoretically range 
from 0%-100%, with greater numbers indicating better recall of the 
relevant words. Thus, for example, the percent positive recall for our 
particular subject would be calculated as follows: recall that he rated 40 
of the 60 words presented as either "Like Much" or "Like Slightly"; the 
relevant fraction would therefore have as the denominator the number 
40; since the subject then recalled 10 of these 40 words rated positively, 
the relevant fraction would be 10/40 or .25 xl00=25% (numbers were 
multiplied by 100 to eliminate the decimal). In other words, the subject 
would have successfully recalled 25 percent of the words he or she had 
rated positively in the affection rating portion of the experiment. A 
similar procedure was followed for the computation of percent negative 
recall. To continue our example, the percent negative recall for our 
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particular subject would be calculated as follows: since he rated 20 of the 
60 words presented as either "Dislike Much" or "Dislike Slightly", the 
relevant fraction would have as the denominator the number 20; since 
the subject then recalled 5 of these 20 words rated negatively, the 
relevant fraction would be 5/20 or .25 xl00=25%. Our subject would 
have successfully recalled 25 percent of the words he rated negatively in 
the affection rating portion of the experiment. This procedure, carried 
out across subjects, provided the relevant scores for analysis of recall 
mem01y. 
Recognition Score Derivation. In the recognition condition we 
again sought to take into consideration the overall percentage of words 
rated positively and negatively by each subject. A relevant fraction was 
computed using a method similar to that described in the recall 
condition, but with one significant modification: in order to provide a 
more stringent test of the hypothesis that subjects would evidence a 
facilitation in recognition memory for words affectively assessed 
positively, it was decided to remove from consideration those words 
which had been successfully recalled (including those evaluated both 
positively and negatively). In doing this, it was presumed that subjects 
would be likely to recognize those words which they had recently recalled 
successfully, since recall presents a more difficult test of memory than 
recognition. In general, then, given the facilitation in recall memory of 
positively-rated over negatively-rated words, we would see more positively 
evaluated than negatively evaluated words being removed from 
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consideration across subjects--thereby making an effect of positive 
affection more difficult to find. 
To calculate the percent recognition for our hypothetical subject, any 
positively or negatively evaluated words that had been correctly recalled 
were first removed from the list of recognizable items. Since our subject 
correctly recalled 10 positive and 5 negative words, this would leave 40-
10=30 positive words and 20-5= 15 negative words that could be correctly 
recognized in this portion of the experiment; thus, 30 and 15 became the 
denominators for the percent positive and negative recognition, 
respectively. To calculate percent recognition, the remaining correctly 
recognized items were separated into those that had been initially rated 
positively and those rated negatively, and divided by the appropriate 
denominator. If our hypothetical subject correctly recognized 20 of the 
remaining words that he had initially rated positively, he would achieve a 
score of 20/30=.67 or 67%. Similarly, if he correctly recognized 10 of the 
remaining words that he had initially rated negatively, he would achieve 
a score of 10/ 15=.67 or 67%. This procedure, carried out across subjects, 
provided the relevant scores for analysis of recognition memory. 
CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS 
There were four dependent measures in the present study: (a) the 
percentage of positively and negatively evaluated words recalled by each 
subject, and (b) the percentage of positively and negatively evaluated 
words recognized by each subject. In order to test the relevant 
experimental hypotheses, the data were subjected to a 2 (Order) x 3 
(Induction) x 2 (Affection) repeated-measure analysis of variance 
(ANOV A), with the first two variables between and the third within 
subjects. Separate omnibus analyses were then carried out for both the 
recall and recognition data. 
Mood and Recall Learning 
Hypothesis I predicted that subjects asked to recall words that they 
had pre-rated for affective assessment would be found to rely more on 
this idiographic measure than they would on the moods that they were 
induced to perform under. A test for a main effect of Affection (within-
subjects) was significant, with subjects in all groups recalling more of 
their positively assessed than their negatively assessed items, as follows: 
Positive Affection M= 17.12, SD=7. 77; Negative Affection M= 14. 14, 
SD=7.29(F=16.403, df= 1, 129, p<.001). 
Hypothesis II predicted that the presence of a mood induction would 
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interact with affection ratings. Relevant scores were entered into a 
factorial analysis of variance having the characteristics of a 3 (Induction) 
x 2 (Affection), with the first variable between and the second within 
subjects. Was the expected effect found? The hypothesis, which can be 
examined by looking at the Affection x Induction interaction, was not 
significant, with the data arraying as follows: a) Positive Induction: 
Positive Affection M=l6.07, SD=7.18; Negative Affection M=l4.36, 
SD=7.15 b) Negative Induction: Positive Affection M= 16.03, SD=8.54; 
Negative Affection M= 13.29, SD=8.02; c) Anagram: Positive Affection 
M=l9.26, SD=7.58; Negative Affection M=l4.76, SD=6.71 (E=.352, df=2, 
129, ll=· 704). 
An unanticipated effect was found for the Order variable. Tests of 
statistical significance indicated that subjects asked to rate words before 
undergoing a mood induction recalled a significantly lower percentage of 
learnable items than subjects undergoing a mood induction first, 
suggesting that there was systematic variation produced by this variable, 
as follows: rating first M= 13.46, SD=7.52; induction first M= 17. 79, 
SD=7.07(F=15.809, df= 1, 129, Q<.001). 
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Table 2 
Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) of Recall Scores for the 




#1) Anagram <N=21): 
#2) Positive (N=20): 
#3) Negative (N=24): 
% Positive Recall % Negative Recall 
20.81 (7.18) 16.76 (7.04) 
18.00 (6.49) 17.15 (6.71) 
19.54 (8.21) 14.50 (6.60) 
Rating/.JMoodlnduction 
#4) Anagram (N =24): 
#5) Positive (N =23): 
#6) Negative (N=23): 








Mood and Reco~nition Learnin~ 
For the recognition conditions, Hypothesis I again predicted that 
subjects would be found to rely more on affective assessment than they 
would on the moods that they were induced to perform under. A test for 
a main effect of Affection (within-subjects) was significant, with subjects 
in all groups recognizing more of their positively assessed than their 
negatively assessed words, as follows: Positive Affection M=86.27, 
SD=9.30; Negative Affection M=79.86, SD= 12.92 (F=28.840, df= l, 129, 
y<.001). 
Hypothesis II also predicted that the presence of a mood induction 
would interact with affection ratings. Relevant scores were entered into 
a factorial analysis of variance having the characteristics of a 3 
(Induction) x 2 (Affection), with the first variable between and the second 
within subjects. The hypothesis, which can be examined by looking at 
the Affection x Induction interaction, was not significant, with the data 
arraying as follows: a) Positive Induction: Positive Affection M=86.65, 
SD=B.99; Negative Affection M=80. 73, SD= 13.99; b) Negative Induction: 
Positive Affection M=86.33, SD= 10.47; c) Anagram: Positive Affection 




Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) of Recognition Scores for the 




#1 Anagram (N=21): 
#2 Positive (N=20): 
#3 Negative (N=24): 









#4) Anagram (N =24): 
#5) Positive (N=23): 
#6) Negative (N=23): 









The results of the present experiment fall nicely in line with the 
predictions of LLT--and particularly the notion that an individual's 
affective assessment is of greater consequence to memory than an 
external mood induction. Indeed, the rationale of Hypothesis I was 
confirmed in both the recall and recognition portions of the experiment. 
In LLT, we have two factors to consider in an experimental task of the 
sort being discussed here--the word rating per se, and the mood context. 
Prior research, and now the present experiment as well, suggest that 
predications have to be pretty generally negative, the mood negative, the 
self-evaluation negative, etc., before we will flatten out the positive 
affective assessment effect. It is the organizing heuristic at the outset of 
learning that ensures solid learning and long-lasting memory rather than 
sheer repetition of such cognitions. Affection undoubtedly serves as a 
major cognitive organizer of this nature: 
Framed in traditional computer lingo, this means that affection 
works at the point of "encoding." But LLT would not have this be 
a question of "input," which suggests that there is already an 
organized item being "taken in" from an unpredicated external 
source. From the LLT perspective, encoding is active organization, 
including affective assessments rendered by an evaluating intellect 
and brought to bear on what can and will then be "known." 
(Rychlak, 1994) 
As just noted, the results of the recognition portion of this 
109 
110 
experiment were also in the direction predicted by LLT. That is, even 
when those words that had previously been remembered in the recall 
portion of the experiment were removed (thereby, on average, removing a 
greater number of positive than negative words from consideration), a 
significant advantage was found for liked versus disliked words. This 
rather robust finding lends further support to the notion that it is the 
individual's predication of the task at hand that plays the greatest role 
in determining memory performance. Or, put another way, we have seen 
that such an effect depends upon "the subject's ability to extend 
meaning to experience in fundamentally different ways, rather than on 
the experimenter's ability to induce fundamentally different 'states."' 
(Lewis & Williams, 1989, p. 168). Thus, subjects who predicate 
themselves, the task at hand, and the world around them in generally 
positive terms are seen to extend positive meanings more readily than 
negative meanings to the people and events around them. And as the 
research discussed above has demonstrated, it is only when individuals 
affectively assess some aspect of the world and/ or themselves in a truly 
negative fashion that we are likely to observe a diminution or reversal of 
this typical predicational style. 
Hypothesis II, which predicted an interaction between mood 
induction and affection ratings, was not supported. Instead, the general 
positive affection effect predicted in Hypothesis I appeared also in the 
negative mood induction conditions of the experiment. That is, in the 
negative recall conditions we did not find the expected diminution of the 
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positive affection effect. While at first such results may seem puzzling, a 
glance back at our literature review may provide some clues as to what 
may have occurred. In Group #3 of the experiment, subjects underwent a 
negative mood induction, followed by the affection ratings of learnable 
personality trait descriptors. This negative mood induction, by 
definition, is a negative experience. The termination of this induction 
might therefore be viewed as being a slightly positive experience, at least 
in contrast to what has just gone before. This is reminiscent of the work 
on nonspecific transfer cited above, in which subjects moving from a 
disliked to a liked task manifest greater improvement than when moving 
in the opposite affective direction (positive nonspecific transfer). When 
provided with the opportunity to affectively predicate the new task, the 
evaluation of learnable materials, subjects may have sought to bolster 
their feelings by, in a sense, re-predicating the task before them. Hence, 
in predicating the rating task positively, and then carrying this generally 
positive affective preference over to the recall task, words with a positive 
affective quality would be favored, as happened in this group. 
In Group #6, in contrast, subjects were given no opportunity to 
essentially re-predicate their circumstances. Why then do we not see an 
advantage of disliked over liked words? Wandrei (1993; see above) 
proposed that LLT could explain various of her observations as the result 
of a naturally positive predication that subjects make when approaching 
a new task or target, as of the sort seen here. This could facilitate the 
effects of a predication based on positive mood, and might inhibit to 
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some extent the extension of negative meaning that comes from a 
negative predication or sad mood. It may therefore be that, in recalling 
memories, subjects continue to use a "positive background framework" 
that is even more basic than that which they generally take on in their 
affective mood state. This fact is further suggested by some of the work 
cited above with depressed individuals, who by definition are prone to see 
themselves and the varying aspects of the world in negative terms. The 
results of such studies tend to be more consistent with notions of mood 
congruence, showing diminutions and even occasional outright reversals 
of the typical positive affection effect. Particularly noteworthy in this 
regard is the study by Slife et al. ( 1984), which showed that as depressed 
individuals were successfully treated with psychotherapy, their affective 
preferences shifted from being predominantly negative back toward the 
usual advantage for positively evaluated materials. 
One unanticipated result of the present experiment involved the 
finding that subjects undergoing a mood induction first (regardless of the 
type of induction), followed by the rating task, recalled a greater 
percentage of learnable words (both positive and negative) than subjects 
receiving the reverse task-order. This pattern of results would seem to be 
an artifact of the experimental design. In the case of those subjects 
performing the affective rating task after the induction, a shorter period 
of time elapsed between their having seen the words and their trying to 
recall them. For subjects completing the rating task first, the presence 
of an intervening task may have adversely affected their ability to recall 
113 
the relevant materials. Such results again follow from the nature of the 
process of predication. Memory is always a matter of reconceptualizing 
prior experience, not just of calling to mind or activating a template or 
engram from the past into the present. As time passes, memories do not 
"wear down" and disappear, but rather alternative predications occur, 
thereby decreasing to some extent the likelihood of recall. Increasingly 
meaningful items of information are less likely to be forgotten, though 
memory is still never a matter of recalling anything free of the 
expectations and biases of the present. 
As we have seen from our examination of the empirical research done 
in both the Kantian spirit of LLT and the more Lockean framework of 
nodal network theory, these formulations, by virtue of their precedent 
frameworks, frame fundamentally different creatures. It is quite true 
that both paradigms have been empirically rigorous in their research; 
however, the differing viewpoints on how knowledge is to be accrued lead 
each side to approach research very differently: 
When knowledge is seen as dependent on the assumptions or 
predications of the observer I participant, empirical research 
becomes a way of validating the claims made by a theory with 
observation. This is the "top down" approach taken by LLT: 
explicit predictions made by the theory are tested in order to see if 
the constructs we use to explain the world fit with the observed 
world. When knowledge is seen as being derived directly from the 
observations themselves, as in the view of a realist, theory is less 
prominent in guiding the actual research, instead being put 
together piece by piece from the observed "facts." The "bottom-up" 
approach of the dustbowl empiricist attempts to rule out bias in 
the observation of events by keeping theories small and directly 
tied to observation. This seems to be more the case with NNTA 
[Nodal Network Theory of Affect], which is referred to in many 
studies of mood and memory not as a guiding formulation of the 
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research, but as an explanation of the observed phenomena. 
(Wandrei, 1993, p. 31) 
Another point which may again be emphasized is that the affective 
assessment is an active event, whereas the so-called "activations" of 
network theories are passive events (much as is any other such 
activation). But this simply raises the question--what differentiates the 
activation of an ordinary passive sentence such as "It is raining" from an 
introspectively conceived evaluation such as "I dislike rain"? The LLT 
notion of a transcending telosponse is suited to rendering an account of 
this phenomenon, whereas more traditional conceptions of the person 
seem incapable of doing so. What would "trigger" such an evaluation? 
And what would lead this evaluation to fall one direction rather than 
another? According to LLT, what mechanistic theories take to be 
"activations" or "reactivations" are, in fact, simply the manifestations of 
ongoing cognition, which by its nature involves the reformulation of 
experience. Hence, such activations are simply the unfolding of the 
introspective organization of the individual under consideration. It is 
not drive-reduction that shapes individual behavior, but rather the sense 
of affective satisfaction experienced as his or her precedent assumptions 
bring rewards in the form of expected/predicted outcomes (positive and 
negative reinforcers). 
Reflections on the Present Study 
The present study suffered from several methodological limitations, 
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each of which has contributed in some way to concerns about the 
internal and external validity of the present findings. One limitation of 
this study was its inability to separate subjects on the basis of gender. 
For this reason, the experiment was incapable of detecting any 
differences in recall and recognition that may have been produced by 
underlying differences in gender. For example, it is possible, if not likely, 
that a more pronounced finding in one gender grouping (e.g., males) may 
have "boosted" the lower scores of the other (i.e., females), thereby 
masking a more limited effect. The obvious answer to this problem will 
be to retain appropriate records in future studies. 
A second design limitation, again of considerable interest, concerns 
the relative effectiveness of the mood inductions employed. While 
previous research cited above suggests that both the Velten ( 1968) 
procedure and the recalling of a relevant personal memory can be 
effective at eliciting a desired mood, this is ideally confirmed within the 
experimental context itself. In the present experiment, we cannot be 
absolutely certain that the effects of the affection ratings actually 
"overcame" the salience of mood induction. If the inductions were not 
truly effective, this pose difficulties for such an interpretation. We have 
here assumed that with normal subjects of the sort found within a 
university setting it will be somewhat difficult to achieve a diminution, 
and particularly an outright reversal, of the positive affection effect 
typically found--even if the mood inductions are effective. Once again, 
though the argument is plausible on the basis of procedural evidence, 
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the true test of such a notion lies with the validating evidence provided 
within the methodological realm. 
Perhaps a more minor point (though this is, of course, an empirical 
question) concerns the nature of the distractor task performed by 
subjects in the anagram conditions. Because the dependent measures of 
the present experiment were essentially based on verbal factors, it may be 
important to provide control subjects with a non-verbal task when 
seeking to balance time considerations across groups. The only subjects 
excluded from providing useful data were in fact subjects from the 
anagram condition who confused the verbal materials of the anagram 
and recall tasks. 
Finally, there is the matter of the reliability of the affection ratings of 
personality trait words obtained from subjects. In prior research in this 
area, Rychlak ( 1988) has typically advised the use of only those words 
which have been reliably rated, meaning that subjects rate words on two 
separate occasions. Researchers then use only those words that have 
been rated "Like Much" and "Dislike Much" on these two occasions as 
learnable items. Time constraints and limitations imposed by subject 
allocation requirements precluded adding this desirable feature to the 
experimental design. 
In order to add support to and extend the present findings, future 
research may well take into consideration the points just made. 
Particularly important will be efforts to validate the effectiveness of mood 
inductions in studies of this sort. This may yet prove to be a formidable 
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task, as there is not complete agreement on just what constitutes a 
"mood." However. it certainly seems that the framework of Logical 
Learning Theory provides one feasible definition--a definition which has 
held up in over twenty years of varied empirical research. 
Concluding Comment 
What one may hopefully see in the context of the present experiment 
and discussion is that the individual human being does contribute 
meaningfully to what he or she can and will know. Through the 
telosponsive process the individual aligns precedent meanings right from 
birth, framing the contents of experience in logical (if not always 
rational) fashion. Given that we must "know" in order "to know," the 
value of a precedent affective dimension should also be readily apparent. 
As a most basic aspect of the telosponsive process, affection allows the 
knowledge-acquisition propensity (memory) of the human being to "get 
underway." The present study is here seen as tending to confirm the 
tenets of the theoretical framework from within which it arose. The 
individual does contribute meaningfully to what comes his or her way, 
and unless this fact is taken into consideration, the result is likely to be 
a theoretical muddle of the sort which currently exists in the field. To 
emphasize the point, we close with a quote from Bower (Bower & Mayer, 
1989), a quote which may be very telling of the current "state" of research 
in this area: 
As noted, the failure to find a mood-context effect in these 
"standard context" experiments impacts negatively upon many 
theories which expect it. The failure contradicts not only the first 
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author's earlier theory of mood as a retrieval cue (Bower, 1981). 
The failure impacts more generally upon any learning theory which 
supposes that internal states act as contexts which by their 
presence can become associated automatically by contiguity to 
memories of coincident events, thus to later cue their retrieval. 
The disconflrmed theories include not only the drive stimulus 
theories noted above but also the arousal-as-cue theory of Clark, 
Milberg, and Ross (1983). Moreover, to the extent that mood 
influences the encoding of verbal material, the failure of MDR 
[mood-dependent retrieval) on measures of recall and recognition 
impacts negatively upon the principle of encoding specificity 
(Tulving and Thomson, 1973). Clearly many theorists have been 
wrong in expecting or explaining MDR. (p. 153) 
APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE IDIOGRAPHIC RATING SHEETS 
FOR AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT 
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On the following page you will see a list of words. Please read each word and 
decide which statement most accurately describes your attitude toward that 
word. Though you may find it difficult to decide for some words, please make 
whatever choice seems most appropriate. Please do not leave any words 
unrated. 
Dislike Dislike Like Like 
Much Slightly Slightly Much 
01. productive 1 2 3 4 
02. grouchy 1 2 3 4 
03. thoughtless 1 2 3 4 
04. informal 1 2 3 4 
05. careless 1 2 3 4 
06. uncongenial 1 2 3 4 
07. friendly 1 2 3 4 
08. understanding 1 2 3 4 
09. conservative 1 2 3 4 
10. cheerful 1 2 3 4 
Dislike Dislike Like Like 
Much Slightly Slightly Much 
11. honest 1 2 3 4 
12. perfectionistic 1 2 3 4 
13. radical 1 2 3 4 
14. changeable 1 2 3 4 
15. headstrong 1 2 3 4 
16. ill-mannered 1 2 3 4 
17. hostile 1 2 3 4 
18. sincere 1 2 3 4 
19.phony 1 2 3 4 
20. responsible 1 2 3 4 
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Dislike Dislike Like Like 
Much Slightly Slightly Much 
21. warm 1 2 3 4 
22. mathematical 1 2 3 4 
23. foolish 1 2 3 4 
24. enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 
25. skillful 1 2 3 4 
26. boring 1 2 3 4 
27. selfish 1 2 3 4 
28. courteous 1 2 3 4 
29. deceitful 1 2 3 4 
30. crafty 1 2 3 4 
Dislike Dislike Like Like 
Much Slightly Slightly Much 
31. scientific 1 2 3 4 
32. unsympathetic 1 2 3 4 
33. unethical 1 2 3 4 
34. generous 1 2 3 4 
35. philosophical 1 2 3 4 
36. considerate 1 2 3 4 
37. lifeless 1 2 3 4 
38. blunt 1 2 3 4 
39. kind-hearted 1 2 3 4 
40. meticulous 1 2 3 4 
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Dislike Dislike Like Like 
Much Slightly Slightly Much 
41. wise 1 2 3 4 
42. nonchalant 1 2 3 4 
43. cautious 1 2 3 4 
44. optimistic 1 2 3 4 
45. lazy 1 2 3 4 
46. tough 1 2 3 4 
47. cold 1 2 3 4 
48. incompetent 1 2 3 4 
49. pessimistic 1 2 3 4 
50. interesting 1 2 3 4 
Dislike Dislike Like Like 
Much Slightly Slightly Much 
51. modest 1 2 3 4 
52.happy 1 2 3 4 
53. cruel 1 2 3 4 
54. forward 1 2 3 4 
55. honorable 1 2 3 4 
56. normal 1 2 3 4 
57. amiable 1 2 3 4 
58. depressed 1 2 3 4 
59. emotional 1 2 3 4 
60. shrewd 1 2 3 4 
APPENDIXB 
SAMPLE: NEGATIVE MOOD INDUCTION STATEMENTS 
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Please Read and Follow the Instructions. If you have any questions, 
please feel free to ask the experimenter. 
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On the following pages you will see a number of statements. Please read 
each statement, and while reading through each of the statements, try to 
experience the state suggested; that is, try to feel the mood described. Spend 
roughly 20 seconds per statement, but more on those which you find 
particularly effective in inducing this mood. The experimenter will notify you 
when you should proceed to the next section. Please go on to the next page 
now. 
The following statements were employed in the depression induction: 
1. I feel unhappy. 
2. I feel sad and blue. 
3. I feel fed up. 
4. I just feel drained of energy, worn out. 
5. I feel pretty low. 
6. Things seem futile, pointless. 
7. I feel hopeless. 
8. I feel downhearted and miserable. 
9. I feel so tired and gloomy that I would rather just sit than do anything. 
10. I feel heavy and sluggish. 
11. It seems such an effort to do much. 
12. I'm fed up with it all. 
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Part II. Recall of a relevant personal memory: 
In the space provided, please record a NEGATIVE memory from your past 
which stands out in your mind. Who was present? What makes this event 
stand out as NEGATIVE? Please record any details you recall which are 
relevant to the event. Your response will remain anonymous and confidential. 
APPENDIXC 
SAMPLE: POSITIVE MOOD INDUCTION STATEMENTS 
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Please Read and Follow the Instructions. If you have any questions, 
please feel free to ask the experimenter. 
127 
On the following pages you will see a number of statements. Please read 
each statement, and while reading through each of the statements, try to 
experience the state suggested; that is, try to feel the mood described. Spend 
roughly 20 seconds per statement, but more on those which you find 
particularly effective in inducing this mood. The experimenter will notify you 
when you should proceed to the next section. Please go on to the next page 
now. 
The following statements were employed in the elation induction: 
1. I feel pretty good right now. 
2. I feel happy. 
3. I feel cheerful, confident. 
4. I can think quickly and clearly right now. 
5. Right now, I feel very contented. 
6. Right now, I feel like smiling. 
7. I feel alert, happy, and full of energy. 
8. I have a feeling of lightness and joy. 
9. I really like this light-hearted feeling. 
10. I can feel a smile on my face. 
11. I feel so good I almost feel like laughing. 
12. It feels great to be alive! 
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Part II. Recall of a relevant personal memorv: 
In the space provided, please record a POSITIVE memory from your past 
which stands out in your mind. Who was present? What makes this event 
stand out as POSITIVE? Please record any details you recall which are 
relevant to the event. Your response will remain anonymous and confidential. 
APPENDIXD 
SAMPLE: INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS 
IN THE ANAGRAM CONDITION 
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The following groups of letters are ordinary words which have been scrambled. 
Please rearrange these letters to form their respective words until the 
experimenter asks you to stop. 
Examples: 
a) ARC= CAR 
b)LCWNO=CLOWN 
1.DIORA= ____ _ 
2.RWAET= ____ _ 
3.KEROJ= ____ _ 
4.EHNOP= ____ _ 
5.KTIHN= ____ _ 
6. WEHEL= ____ _ 
7.NYMOE= ____ _ 
8.DBIER= ____ _ 
9.CTARO= ____ _ 
10.0ERSH= ____ _ 
11.GUDEJ = ____ _ 
12.0WLEB =-----
13.SLACP= ____ _ 
14.PEOKR= ____ _ 
15. WSITN= ____ _ 
16.KPRAS= ____ _ 
17.HITGL= ____ _ 
18.NHTGI= ____ _ 
19.0EMVI= ____ _ 
20.KIRND= ____ _ 
21. SE RAP= ____ _ 
22.ALICM= ____ _ 
23.KSANE= ____ _ 
24.NHAYD= ____ _ 
25.RWTEI= ____ _ 
26.SPRAG= ____ _ 
27.DNRBA= ____ _ 
28. UPHNC= ____ _ 
29.KRIBC= ____ _ 
30.0LNVE= ____ _ 
31. UKTCR= ____ _ 
32.IPONA= ____ _ 
33.CHLOT= ____ _ 
34.HTOTO= ____ _ 
35.ZABEL= ____ _ 
36.SMEGR= ____ _ 
37.0CTUR= ____ _ 
38.PREAP= ____ _ 
39.TSLEY= ____ _ 
40.DAGER= ____ _ 
APPENDIXE 
SAMPLE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECALL SECTION OF EXPERIMENT 
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Below are a number of blank spaces. In these spaces please write as 
many words as you can recall from the list of words which you rated in 
the first portion of this experiment. 
APPENDIXF 
SAMPLE: INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECOGNITION 
PORTION OF EXPERIMENT 
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Look at each of the following words and decide whether ''Yes," you saw 
it previously in this experimental context. or ''No," you did not. Circle 
the appropriate response. Do not skip any. 
001. bold Yes No 
002. conceited Yes No 
003. excited Yes No 
004. thoughtful Yes No 
005. thoughtless Yes No 
006. understanding Yes No 
007. meticulous Yes No 
008. sincere Yes No 
009. bossy Yes No 
010. loyal Yes No 
011. informal Yes No 
012. changeable Yes No 
013. warm Yes No 
014. respectful Yes No 
015. bashful Yes No 
016. modest Yes No 
017. radical Yes No 
018. generous Yes No 
019. lively Yes No 
020.silent Yes No 
021. incompetent Yes No 
022. vulgar Yes No 
023. aimless Yes No 
024. mature Yes No 
025. grateful Yes No 
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026. forgiving Yes No 
027. cowardly Yes No 
028. selfish Yes No 
029. jealous Yes No 
030. humorous Yes No 
031. happy Yes No 
032. depressed Yes No 
033. interesting Yes No 
034. quiet Yes No 
035. nonchalant Yes No 
036. strict Yes No 
037. emotional Yes No 
038. cheerful Yes No 
039. educated Yes No 
040. honest Yes No 
041. forward Yes No 
042. reliable Yes No 
043. ill-mannered Yes No 
044. pessimistic Yes No 
045. shrewd Yes No 
046. courteous Yes No 
047. naive Yes No 
048. snobbish Yes No 
049. kind-hearted Yes No 
050. blunt Yes No 
051. wasteful Yes No 
052. amiable Yes No 
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053. tactless Yes No 
054. tolerant Yes No 
055. daredevil Yes No 
056. truthful Yes No 
057. cautious Yes No 
058. unsympathetic Yes No 
059. witty Yes No 
060. self-conscious Yes No 
061. aggressive Yes No 
062. friendly Yes No 
063. tough Yes No 
064. conventional Yes No 
065. crafty Yes No 
066. obnoxious Yes No 
067. skillful Yes No 
068. mathematical Yes No 
069. wordy Yes No 
070. imaginative Yes No 
071. responsible Yes No 
072. cold Yes No 
073. clownish Yes No 
07 4. deliberate Yes No 
075.phony Yes No 
076. normal Yes No 
077. considerate Yes No 
078. intolerant Yes No 
079. capable Yes No 
080. conservative Yes No 
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081. lazy Yes No 
082. productive Yes No 
083. antisocial Yes No 
084. trusting Yes No 
085. unfair Yes No 
086. scientific Yes No 
087. skeptical Yes No 
088. hostile Yes No 
089. careless Yes No 
090. enthusiastic Yes No 
091. authoritative Yes No 
092. shallow Yes No 
093. insecure Yes No 
094. deceitful Yes No 
095. foolish Yes No 
096. childish Yes No 
097. ordinary Yes No 
098. optimistic Yes No 
099. boring Yes No 
100. lonely Yes No 
101. unselfish Yes No 
102. perfectionistic Yes No 
103. spiteful Yes No 
104. philosophical Yes No 
105. unpredictable Yes No 
106. honorable Yes No 
107. lifeless Yes No 
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108. methodical Yes No 
109. wise Yes No 
110. weak Yes No 
111. angry Yes No 
112. headstrong Yes No 
113. uncongenial Yes No 
114. unethical Yes No 
115. energetic Yes No 
116. cruel Yes No 
11 7. creative Yes No 
118. spirited Yes No 
119. grouchy Yes No 
120. unkind Yes No 
APPENDIX G 
UNTRANSFORMED RAW SCORES 
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The following data represent the untransformed ratio (percentage) scores 
for each subject. Columns one and two represent the percentage of 
positive and negative words recalled, respectively. Columns three and 
four represent the percentage of positive and negative words recognized, 
respectively. 
Subtect Group 2n! I!!2 I!!!:!! l2.!!!: 
1 1 7 25 93 69 
2 1 22 18 72 33 
3 1 25 18 91 81 
4 1 32 7 83 91 
5 1 5 15 84 67 
6 1 17 10 85 68 
7 1 23 30 86 55 
8 1 16 8 78 81 
9 1 18 18 95 90 
10 1 18 19 81 94 
11 1 20 12 89 89 
12 1 16 3 84 82 
13 1 37 16 96 88 
14 1 27 22 96 71 
15 1 22 21 76 70 
16 1 24 6 84 75 
17 1 17 19 75 71 
18 1 21 22 70 83 
19 1 24 15 96 86 
20 1 26 23 91 82 
21 1 20 25 90 64 
22 2 16 22 77 94 
23 2 26 18 80 85 
24 2 14 8 77 61 
25 2 26 29 82 81 
26 2 32 17 90 78 
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27 2 19 18 100 100 
28 2 6 0 85 76 
29 2 16 25 78 83 
30 2 17 17 83 71 
31 2 26 21 96 100 
32 2 16 18 67 36 
33 2 16 21 88 71 
34 2 19 11 75 80 
35 2 23 13 100 95 
36 2 15 0 97 75 
37 2 12 16 100 92 
38 2 13 14 84 45 
39 2 7 19 88 77 
40 2 19 22 90 100 
41 2 22 25 92 100 
42 3 15 4 96 79 
43 3 6 8 100 95 
44 3 0 7 88 82 
45 3 25 8 93 94 
46 3 27 11 83 63 
47 3 29 8 96 83 
48 3 16 14 81 92 
49 3 18 19 91 92 
50 3 27 15 79 87 
51 3 16 21 93 82 
52 3 17 13 67 70 
53 3 23 27 71 85 
54 3 29 20 74 77 
55 3 19 21 82 75 
56 3 26 19 56 50 
57 3 13 20 100 85 
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58 3 18 5 94 86 
59 3 7 7 97 92 
60 3 24 13 88 82 
61 3 30 19 83 88 
62 3 31 15 90 100 
63 3 11 9 98 93 
64 3 24 26 93 71 
65 3 18 19 93 84 
66 4 31 13 58 86 
67 4 21 10 91 79 
68 4 12 4 93 88 
69 4 13 20 96 100 
70 4 14 17 88 89 
71 4 19 21 84 91 
72 4 26 8 79 74 
73 4 29 23 87 65 
74 4 11 13 88 89 
75 4 29 11 80 69 
76 4 8 14 74 68 
77 4 15 4 76 64 
78 4 9 13 88 69 
79 4 20 17 92 80 
80 4 25 25 96 90 
81 4 16 15 82 83 
82 4 13 7 92 89 
83 4 29 3 100 89 
84 4 25 11 92 100 
85 4 6 12 87 64 
86 4 18 12 82 74 
87 4 13 17 95 93 
88 4 18 10 88 84 
143 
89 4 5 6 83 75 
90 5 11 16 76 87 
91 5 15 15 76 60 
92 5 12 15 86 96 
93 5 20 7 100 96 
94 5 9 11 100 92 
95 5 14 13 76 76 
96 5 12 18 100 77 
97 5 11 0 86 74 
98 5 5 0 85 63 
99 5 18 8 77 85 
100 5 8 13 89 77 
101 5 26 24 100 84 
102 5 9 7 86 72 
103 5 31 7 95 83 
104 5 9 11 84 71 
105 5 15 15 100 90 
106 5 6 21 83 74 
107 5 16 7 83 93 
108 5 24 13 71 75 
109 5 10 10 97 86 
110 5 29 24 87 79 
111 5 6 3 76 89 
112 5 9 8 93 100 
113 6 10 16 78 78 
114 6 19 21 100 88 
115 6 11 0 86 71 
116 6 23 13 76 73 
117 6 14 12 90 70 
118 6 14 4 91 65 
119 6 13 40 96 63 
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120 6 3 8 64 65 
121 6 28 14 76 74 
122 6 6 7 94 83 
123 6 2 0 67 92 
124 6 8 4 83 82 
125 6 11 8 97 82 
126 6 0 15 83 100 
127 6 11 17 94 78 
128 6 18 11 100 100 
129 6 16 18 97 100 
130 6 14 21 87 55 
131 6 9 15 87 91 
132 6 6 0 83 78 
133 6 19 21 76 58 
134 6 27 13 93 85 
135 6 6 0 69 69 
APPENDIXH 
TRANSFORMED RAW SCORES 
145 
146 
The following data represent the transformed ratio (percentage) scores for 
each subject. As above, columns one and two represent the percentage of 
positive and negative words recalled, respectively. Columns three and 
four represent the percentage of positive and negative words recognized, 
respectively. The following scores have been transformed according to 
Winer ( 1965) [Appendix B.5] 
Sublect Group ~ I!!2 ~ f2!!! 
1 1 0.5355 1.0472 2.6062 1.9606 
2 1 0.9764 0.8763 2.0264 1.2239 
3 1 1.0472 0.8763 2.5322 2.2395 
4 1 1.2025 0.5355 2.2916 2.5322 
5 1 0.4510 0.7954 2.3186 1.9177 
6 1 0.8500 0.6435 2.3462 1.9391 
7 1 1.0004 1.1593 2.3746 1.6710 
8 1 0.8230 0.5735 2.1652 2.2395 
9 1 0.8763 0.8763 2. 7093 2.4981 
10 1 0.8763 0.9021 2.2395 2.6467 
11 1 0.9273 0. 7075 2.4655 2.4655 
12 1 0.8230 0.3482 2.3186 2.2653 
13 1 1.3078 0.8230 2.7189 2.4341 
14 1 1.0928 0.9764 2. 7389 2.0042 
15 1 0.9764 0.9521 2.1177 1.9823 
16 1 1.0239 0.4949 2.3186 2.0944 
17 1 0.8500 0.9021 2.0944 2.0042 
18 1 0.9521 0.9764 1.9823 2.2916 
19 1 1.0239 0.7954 2.7389 2.3746 
20 1 1.0701 1.0004 2.5322 2.2653 
21 1 0.9273 1.0472 2.4981 1.8546 
22 2 0.8230 0.9764 2.1412 2.6467 
23 2 1.0701 0.8763 2.2143 2.3462 
24 2 0.7670 0.5735 2.1412 1.7926 
25 2 1.0701 1.1374 2.2653 2.2395 
147 
26 2 1.2025 0.8500 2.4981 2.1652 
27 2 0.9021 0.8763 3.0783 3.0783 
28 2 0.4949 0.0633 2.3462 2.1177 
29 2 0.8230 1.0472 2.1652 2.2916 
30 2 0.8500 0.8500 2.2916 2.0042 
31 2 1.0701 0.95212.72883.0783 
32 2 0.8230 0.8763 1.9177 1.2870 
33 2 0.8230 0.9521 2.4341 2.0042 
34 2 0.9021 0.67612.09442.2143 
35 2 1.0004 0.7377 3.0783 2.6906 
36 2 0.7954 0.0633 2.7652 2.0944 
37 2 0.7075 0.8230 3.0783 2.5681 
38 2 0.7377 0.7670 2.3186 1.4706 
39 2 0.5355 0.9021 2.4341 2.1412 
40 2 0.9021 0.9764 2.4981 3.0783 
41 2 0.9764 1.0472 2.5681 3.0783 
42 3 0.7954 0.4027 2.7189 2.1895 
43 3 0.4949 0.5735 3.0783 2.6906 
44 3 0.0633 0.5355 2.4341 2.2653 
45 3 1.0472 0.5735 2.6062 2.6467 
46 3 1.0928 0.6761 2.2916 1.8338 
47 3 1.1374 0.5735 2.7389 2.2916 
48 3 0.8230 0. 7670 2.2395 2.5681 
49 3 0.8763 0.9021 2.5322 2.5681 
50 3 1.0928 0.7954 2.1895 2.4039 
51 3 0.8230 0.9521 2.6062 2.2653 
52 3 0.8500 0. 7377 1.9177 1.9823 
53 3 1.0004 1.0928 2.0042 2.3462 
54 3 1.1374 0.9273 2.0715 2.1412 
55 3 0.9021 0.95212.26532.0944 
56 3 1.0701 0.9021 1.6911 1.5708 
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57 3 0. 7377 0.9273 3.0783 2.3462 
58 3 0.8763 0.4510 2.6467 2.3746 
59 3 0.5355 0.5355 2.7819 2.5681 
60 3 1.0239 0. 7377 2.4341 2.2653 
61 3 1.1593 0.90212.29162.4341 
62 3 1.1810 0.7954 2.4981 3.0783 
63 3 0.67610.60942.8240 2.6062 
64 3 1.0239 1.0701 2.6062 2.0042 
65 3 0.8763 0.90212.60622.3186 
66 4 1.1810 0.7377 1.7315 2.3746 
67 4 0.95210.64352.5322 2.1895 
68 4 0.7075 0.4027 2.6062 2.4341 
69 4 0.7377 0.9273 2.7440 3.0783 
70 4 0.7670 0.8500 2.4341 2.4655 
71 4 0.9021 0.9521 2.3186 2.5322 
72 4 1.07010.57352.1895 2.0715 
73 4 1.1374 1.0004 2.4039 1.8755 
74 4 0.67610.73772.4341 2.4655 
75 4 1.1374 0.67612.21431.9606 
76 4 0.5735 0.7670 2.0715 1.9391 
77 4 0.7954 0.4027 2.1177 1.8546 
78 4 0.6094 0.7377 2.4341 1.9606 
79 4 0.9273 0.8500 2.5681 2.2143 
80 4 1.0472 1.0472 2.7288 2.4981 
81 4 0.8230 0.7954 2.2653 2.2916 
82 4 0.7377 0.5355 2.5681 2.4655 
83 4 1.1374 0.3482 3.0783 2.4655 
84 4 1.0472 0.6761 2.5681 3.0783 
85 4 0.4949 0. 7075 2 .4039 1.8546 
86 4 0.8763 0.7075 2.2653 2.0715 
87 4 0.7377 0.8500 2.6906 2.6062 
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88 4 0.8763 0.6435 2.4341 2.3186 
89 4 0.4510 0.4949 2.2916 2.0944 
90 5 0.67610.82302.1177 2.4039 
91 5 O. 7954 0. 7954 2.1177 1. 7722 
92 5 0.7075 0.7954 2.3746 2.7189 
93 5 0.9273 0.5355 3.0783 2.7189 
94 5 0.6094 0.67613.07832.5681 
95 5 0. 7670 0. 7377 2.1177 2.1177 
96 5 0.7075 0.8763 3.0783 2.1412 
97 5 0.67610.06332.3746 2.0715 
98 5 0.4510 0.0633 2.3462 1.8338 
99 5 0.8763 0.5735 2.1412 2.3462 
100 5 0.5735 0.7377 2.4655 2.1412 
101 5 1.0701 1.0239 3.0783 2.3186 
102 5 0.6094 0.5355 2.3746 2.0264 
103 5 1.1810 0.5355 2.7045 2.2916 
104 5 0.6094 0.67612.31862.0042 
105 5 0.7954 0.7954 3.0783 2.4981 
106 5 0.4949 0.9521 2.2916 2.0715 
107 5 0.8230 0.5355 2.2916 2.6062 
108 5 1.0239 0.7377 2.0042 2.0944 
109 5 0.6435 0.6435 2.7876 2.3746 
110 5 1.1374 1.0239 2.4039 2.1895 
111 5 0.4949 0.3482 2.1177 2.4655 
112 5 0.6094 0.5735 2.6062 3.0783 
113 6 0.6435 0.8230 2.1652 2.1652 
114 6 0.9021 0.9521 3.0783 2.4341 
115 6 0.67610.06332.3746 2.0042 
116 6 1.0004 0. 7377 2.1177 2.0488 
117 6 0.7670 o. 7075 2.4981 1.9823 
118 6 0.7670 0.4027 2.5322 1.8755 
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119 6 0.7377 1.3694 2.7189 1.8338 
120 6 0.3482 0.5735 1.8546 1.8755 
121 6 1.1152 0. 76702.1177 2.0715 
122 6 0.4949 0.5355 2.6467 2.2916 
123 6 0.2838 0.0633 I.9177 2.5681 
124 6 0.5735 0.4027 2.2916 2.2653 
125 6 0.67610.57352.7762 2.2653 
126 6 0.0633 0.7954 2.2916 3.0783 
127 6 0.67610.85002.6467 2.1652 
128 6 0.8763 0.6761 3.0783 3.0783 
129 6 0.8230 0.8763 2.7707 3.0783 
130 6 0.7670 0.95212.40391.6710 
131 6 0.6094 0.7954 2.4039 2.5322 
132 6 0.4949 0.0633 2.2916 2.1652 
133 6 0.9021 0.95212.11771.7315 
134 6 1.0928 0.7377 2.6062 2.3462 
135 6 0.4949 0.0633 1.9606 1.9606 
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